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INTRODUCTION
Like the diffusion of water that has spilled over its
riverbank, the legal concept of an offer has spread from its
contract law origins into areas of the law as diverse as
criminal law and intellectual property law. The spread of this
common law concept has occurred without much attention or
analysis, an oversight that this Article seeks to redress.
In analyzing the spread of the offer concept throughout
the law, the following Part I deconstructs the contract law
meaning of an offer and demonstrates that while the offer
concept continues to play a policy role in the law of contracts,
it is at best a secondary policy tool. Part II of this Article
surveys several areas of the law that have imported the offer
concept and analyzes how each area uses the concept to
achieve policy goals. The analysis shows that, perhaps
unsurprisingly, the policies underlying the offer concept in
these various areas of law differ from the original contract
law policies.
Surprisingly, however, while at times
lawmakers have extensively modified the definition of an
offer to better achieve specific policy objectives, at other times
lawmakers have imported the offer concept with no apparent
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analysis of whether and how they should modify the
definition to best achieve policy objectives.
Part III provides a case study of patent law’s use of the
offer concept to regulate patent infringement. This study is
divided into two parts: the first part provides a normative
analysis of how the offer concept should be used to regulate
patent infringement, and the second part analyzes the
legislative text and context of the offer concept as it currently
appears in patent law. The study reveals that the legislature
appears to have given little thought to how it should use the
offer concept in patent law, and courts interpret the term
“offer” in such a manner as to cling to an ill-fitted contract
law definition.
Part IV provides observations on and
suggestions for using the offer concept as a policy tool in
patent law and beyond.
I.

DECONSTRUCTING THE CONTRACT LAW OFFER

The concept of an offer that an offeree may accept to
create a contract is a pillar of contract law. First-year law
students spend numerous contracts classes immersed in the
complexities of offers: offers can be terminated by a counteroffer, rejection, the death of the offeror, revocation, lapse, and
so on (and the rules all change if the offer is an option).1
Based on the attention given to the offer concept in law
school, one might think it has existed as long as the law itself.
It has not.
Instead, the offer concept is only one of several tools
(including acceptance and consideration) adopted to explain
and regulate contract formation. In fact, the formal concept
of an offer did not appear until about the mid-eighteenth
century, when Pothier2 developed it (along with acceptance)
After that development, the concept
in French law.3
eventually migrated to England and America. Precursors of
the concept can be found in Roman law, but the formalized

1. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 36–37 (1981).
2. Robert Joseph Pothier (1699–1772) was a French jurist who had an
enormous influence in the law of contracts in Europe, England, and America,
and he is best known for his work TRAITE D’OBLIGATIONS (1761). See Joseph M.
Perillo, Robert J. Pothier’s Influence on the Common Law of Contract, 11 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 267, 267 n.1, 269 (2005).
3. See Parviz Owsia, The Notion and Function of Offer and Acceptance
Under French and English Law, 66 TUL. L. REV. 871, 873–75 (1992).
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concepts of a sequential offer and acceptance did not exist
until Pothier identified them, and the concepts did not gain
prominence until the nineteenth century.4 As the renowned
legal historian A.W.B. Simpson explains it, the offer-andacceptance doctrine grew out of the requirement of
consideration and performed some of the same functions.5
The simplicity and concreteness of an offer that the
offeree can accept makes a wonderful pedagogical tool.
Though a formal offer need not be identified for a contract to
exist,6 many contracts textbooks treat offers prominently in
the discussion of contract formation.7 Focusing on offer and
acceptance—the sequence that creates a great number of
contracts—helps people conceptualize the contract formation
process.
In addition to being a good pedagogical tool, the offer
concept helps justify and regulate the contract formation
process. For example, when analyzing a simple offer of
exchange (“I offer to sell you a book for $10”), one might
conclude that the statement should have the potential to bind
the speaker as a normative matter because people ought
generally to do what they say they will do.8 Or, one might
believe an offer should be able to bind the speaker because, as
a matter of efficiency, the offeree should be able to rely on the
offeror’s promise so that the offeree can best arrange his
subsequent affairs.9
But to identify one example of an offer does not define an
offer, and the simple example of the sale of a book for money
masks many questions. For example, assuming that society

4. See id. at 873–75; see also A.W.B. Simpson, Innovation in Nineteenth
Century Contract Law, 91 L.Q. REV. 247, 258–62 (1975).
5. Simpson, supra note 4, at 258.
6. See U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (1990) (“A contract for sale of goods may be made
in any manner sufficient to show agreement . . . .”).
7. See, e.g., E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 126 (7th ed. 2008) (“Nonetheless, it is useful at least to begin with
the assumption of a clear offer followed by a clear acceptance.”).
8. This statement invites debate about whether an offer is a promise, a
debate that is beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg,
The Revocation of Offers, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 271, 273–78 (2004) (and sources
cited therein); Samuel Williston, An Offer is a Promise, 23 ILL. L. REV. 100
(1928); Samuel Williston, Is An Offer a Promise?, 22 ILL. L. REV. 788 (1928).
9. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48
STAN. L. REV. 481, 501–09 (1996); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing
Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980).
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does not want every promise to be legally binding as a
contract,10 one must decide when contracts (that is, binding
promises) exist and when they do not. To assist in drawing
the line between legally enforceable and unenforceable
promises, the common law developed a formal definition of an
offer: “the manifestation of willingness to enter into a
bargain, so made as to justify another person in
understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and
will conclude it.”11 As discussed below, this definition results
largely from the balancing that contract law performs in
allowing parties to enter into contracts as easily as possible
and not allowing contracts to be entered into so easily as to
become a nuisance.
On the one hand, traditional contract law seeks to ensure
that individuals have the freedom to enter into contracts
according to their will and without having to comply with
rigid formalities. This freedom may be called “freedom to
contract,” and it includes the notion that ordinary people
should generally be able to order their affairs as they wish
through contracts and do so without the need for lawyers,
other experts, or sophisticated rituals.12 A sufficient measure
of freedom to contract protects individuals’ autonomy by
allowing them to enter into contracts if they choose13 and
facilitates an efficient economy in which parties can bind
themselves and their trading partners in enforceable
contracts with relative ease and little formality.
On the other hand, traditional contract law also seeks to
ensure that individuals are free from having contractual
obligations imposed on them unexpectedly. This freedom
may be referred to as “freedom from contract,” and it is rooted
10. Who, after all, wants to be legally bound to every idle promise, such as a
promise to call a friend back in a few minutes?
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981).
12. See Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, 19 L.R. Eq. 462,
465 (V.C. 1875) (“[M]en of full age and competent understanding shall have the
utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely
and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of justice.”).
See generally P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
(1979); Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the ‘Rise and Fall,’
79 B.U. L. REV. 263 (1999).
13. The objective theory of contracts places some limits on an individual’s
autonomy, since whether an act is an offer is judged objectively and not with
reference to the offeror’s subjective choices/intentions. E.g., Wayne Barnes, The
Objective Theory of Contracts, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1119, 1120 (2008).
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in similar concerns for autonomy and economic efficiency.14 It
embodies the notions that freedom includes the ability to
avoid becoming contractually bound except through the
informed exercise of the will15 and that economic efficiency is
best attained when parties are able to engage in negotiations
without fear of incurring unintended contractual liability
(since they might otherwise forgo negotiations altogether,
possibly ending all but the simplest transactions).16
Thus it may be said that the traditional rules governing
contract formation represent tools used to balance freedom to
contract and freedom from contract, making contracts neither
too difficult nor too easy to create.17 Among the balancing
tools the law uses is the concept of an offer, traditionally the
first step in creating a contract.18 The offer definition helps
protect the freedom to contract by allowing offers to result
from myriad manifestations of willingness to enter into a
bargain. Instead of requiring the offeror19 to use special
words or rituals, the definition permits a broad array of
actions (including but not limited to words) to constitute an
offer, making it easy (but as explained immediately below,
not too easy) for the offer to come into being.20 Further, the
offeror can define the terms of the eventual bargain and can

14. See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary
Agreements: Fair Dealings and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 221
(1987) (discussing the traditional view of freedom from contract); Omri BenShahar, Freedom From Contract, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 261, 261 (2004).
15. Again, the offeror’s choice is limited in some respects by the objective
interpretation of his acts. See Barnes, supra note 13.
16. E.g., Ben-Shahar, supra note 14, at 267–68 (describing arguments in
favor of freedom from contract).
17. See Edwin W. Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 COLUM. L.
REV. 929, 948 (1958) (“A good legal rule as to the enforceability of promises
should make contracting available to nonlawyers who will take pains to clarify
their ideas as to what they want to contract about; yet it should not make
contracting so easy that it hooks the unwary signer or the casual promisor. The
first may be called freedom to contract, the second, freedom from contract.”).
18. An offer and its corresponding acceptance typically constitute the
bargained-for consideration necessary to support the parties’ promises.
19. Throughout this Article, I refer to the offeror as the party who proposes
a potential bargain, regardless of whether her actions qualify as a formal offer.
20. See, e.g., 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 2.2, at 108
(Joseph M. Perillo, ed., rev. ed. 1993) (“[T]here is no magic formula to determine
whether a particular communication is an offer . . . .[T]he ordinary meaning of
language is influential, but never determinative. For example, the word ‘quote’
may be understood as making a commitment, while the word ‘offer’ may, in
context be deemed a mere price quotation.” (footnote omitted)).
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require an acceptance to take a certain form.
Additionally, the offer definition protects freedom from
contract by placing an important restriction on the
manifestations that can constitute an offer: the manifestation
must be clear enough so that the offeree should understand
that his “assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude
it.”21 That is, the manifestation, while not forced into any
particular form or language, must meet a minimum degree of
formality such that it is clear that the offeror seriously
contemplates a binding deal. The law includes this hesitancy
to label conduct as an offer because of the offeror’s
vulnerability should the label attach: once an offer has been
communicated, the power to create a contract shifts almost
entirely to the offeree, who need only indicate assent.22 That
is, by labeling something an “offer,” the law puts the parties
one step (acceptance) away from transforming their
relationship from a pre-contractual environment of individual
autonomy and personal norms to a post-contractual
environment that, while presumably centered on terms to
which the parties voluntarily agreed, nevertheless contains
government-imposed responsibilities23 and remedies.24 In
light of the power shift from the offeror to the offeree, if the
law too readily labels conduct an offer, potential offerors
might reduce their interactions for fear of being exposed to
undesired legal liability or might incur wasteful transaction
costs in an effort to ensure that their conduct is not treated as
an offer.25
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981).
22. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.10, at 131 (4th ed. 2004)
(“Courts have reason for caution, since to hold the maker of a proposal to a
contract exposes the maker to liability based on the recipient’s expectation
interest, even in the absence of any reliance.”). The offeror may not be
completely vulnerable; she may be able to revoke. In addition, the offeror can
prescribe particular manners by which the offeree must accept.
23. For example, the law provides gap-filling terms even though the parties
never agreed on them. See, e.g., id. §§ 7.15–.17, at 480–500.
24. Although an individual who backs out of selling an item before making
an offer might face the ire of the potential purchaser and other friends, if
instead the individual has made a formal offer, the other party may accept
immediately and hold the seller liable for either specific performance or
damages. See 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
1:1, at 3 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 2007) (defining a contract as a promise for
which the law will provide a remedy when it is breached).
25. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar, supra note 14, at 267–68; Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
Expression Rules in Contract Law and Problems of Offer and Acceptance, 82
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Thus, to prevent contractual obligations from surprising
parties who did not intend currently to be bound, contract law
sets the bar for what constitutes an offer higher than it
otherwise might: to be an offer, a communication must be
sufficiently clear to be accepted without anything other than
an offeree giving a return promise or performing the required
action.26 This principle of restraint has caused courts to tend
to distinguish offers from mere negotiations, advertisements,
and invitations to offer, rationalizing the exclusions on the
ground that “neither the advertiser nor the reader of the
[advertisement] understands that the reader is empowered to
close the deal without further expression by the advertiser.”27
This view has been challenged, with some scholars calling for
courts
to
presume
advertisements
and
similar
communications are offers.28 The common law presumption
that advertisements are generally not offers remains,
however, and its rationale, while not irrefutable, is not
unreasonable. For example, it lessens the likelihood that an
advertiser will unintentionally enter into a contract (or too
many contracts).29
Contract law could, of course, choose a more active policy
role for the offer concept, such as using it to police false

CAL. L. REV. 1127, 1178 (1994) (noting that liability concerns might reduce the
amount of contracting, but also arguing that making contracting too difficult
would reduce people’s autonomy to choose to enter into contracts).
26. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 22, § 3.3, at 110 (“[An offer] can be defined
as a manifestation to another of assent to enter into a contract if the other
manifests assent in return by some action, often a promise but sometimes a
performance. By making the offer, the offeror thus confers upon the offeree the
power to create a contract.” (footnote omitted)). Other doctrines, including
consideration, also slow contract formation.
27. CORBIN, supra note 20, at 116.
28. See Eisenberg, supra note 25, at 1167–68 (“Suppose a store advertises
17” Sony TVs at $350, a customer comes in and says he will buy the TV at that
price, and the salesman responds, ‘We’re not selling the set at $350, but we’ll
sell it at $400.’ The reaction of the customer would not be, as Corbin would
have it, ‘Of course; I understand; your advertisement was only inviting me to
consider and examine and negotiate,’ but instead, ‘You people are liars, cheats,
or both.’ ” ); Jay M. Feinman & Stephen R. Brill, Is an Advertisement an Offer?
Why It Is and Why It Matters, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 61 (2006) (arguing that
advertisements are offers).
29. Contract law recognizes that advertisements may be specific enough to
constitute an offer, such as where they specify the price, quantity, and who may
make the purchase (e.g., first come, first served). See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Great
Minneapolis Surplus Store, Inc., 86 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Minn. 1957). In addition,
many other laws regulate advertisements. See infra note 30.
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advertising; it has not taken that path though, and is content
to let the offer concept take a lesser policy role compared to
In
other formation doctrines, such as consideration.30
addition, concerns about fairness and false advertising are
largely policed by laws outside of the traditional contract
realm, such as unfair and deceptive trade practice laws.31
Rather than increasing in significance, the role of the
offer has decreased since its zenith in the mid-to-late
nineteenth-century, after which scholars increasingly
observed some of the weaknesses of a rigid and oversimplified
offer-and-acceptance approach to contract formation.32 The
usefulness and preeminence of a strict offer-and-acceptance
paradigm began to strain under the weight of standardized
forms, the so-called battle of the forms, and evermore complex
deals
involving
non-serial
communications
between
individuals, but rather rounds of negotiation involving
managers, officers, and lawyers. These complexities make it
difficult to pinpoint a formal offer.33 In many sophisticated
negotiations, there is no explicit offer for a party to accept and
thus there is “little occasion to apply the classic rules of offer
and acceptance.”34
Recognizing these difficulties, courts have at times
abolished the all-or-nothing formation test, ignored the
30. This is not surprising, as the offer definition largely grew out of, and
incorporates the doctrine of, bargained-for consideration. See Simpson, supra
note 4, at 258.
31. Various federal and state laws regulate advertising and other unfair
and deceptive trade practices to protect consumers. See, e.g., Anthony Paul
Dunbar, Comment, Consumer Protection: The Practical Effectiveness of State
Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 59 TUL. L. REV. 427 (1984) (discussing
various consumer protection laws); Stewart Macaulay, Bambi Meets Godzilla:
Reflections on Contracts Scholarship and Teaching v. State Unfair and
Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Statutes, 26 HOUS. L. REV.
575, 582–89 (1989) (discussing state unfair and deceptive trade practices that
may impact contracts); Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade
Practices Acts: Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437
(1991) (discussing FTC consumer protection laws). It is likely that the laws
concerning unfair and deceptive trade practices are a better avenue for policing
fairness issues than offer and acceptance, but that analysis is beyond the scope
of this Article.
32. See, e.g., Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the
Resulting Legal Relations, 26 YALE L.J. 169, 205–06 (1917); K.N. Llewellyn, On
Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, I, 48 YALE L.J. 1, 14–29
(1938).
33. See Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 218–20.
34. Id. at 219.
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search for an offer, and even held parties liable precontractually.35 In addition to the decreasing significance of
the contract law offer, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code,36 a model code governing the sale of goods,
demonstrates the decline of the offer by explicitly dispensing
with the requirements of an identifiable offer37 and moment of
formation.38
In conclusion, while the offer concept continues to play a
policy role in the law of contracts, for example in helping to
balance freedom-from and freedom-to contract, it is a
secondary policy tool. The next section demonstrates that, in
stark contrast to contract law, the offer concept plays a more
overt policy role in other areas of the law to which it has
migrated, including trademark law,39 securities law,40
environmental law,41 criminal law,42 and patent law.43 The
policies underlying the offer concept in these various areas of
law differ from the original contract law policies, and in many
instances lawmakers have extensively modified the definition
of an offer to better achieve specific policy objectives. At other
times, however, lawmakers have imported the offer concept
with no apparent analysis of whether the contract law
definition is congruent with the new legal environment or
whether and how they should modify the definition to best
achieve policy objectives. As will be seen, this has led to
confusion and sub-optimal roles for the offer concept.

35. See generally id.; Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain,
44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 673 (1969).
36. The U.C.C. came about through a joint project between the National
Council of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law
Institute in the 1940s. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI
AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 1.7, at 15 (6th ed. 2009). After revisions, every
state except Louisiana adopted a version of the U.C.C. (though with various
modifications) between 1957 and 1967. Id.
37. See U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (1990) (“A contract for sale of goods may be made
in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties
which recognizes the existence of such a contract.”).
38. See id. § 2-204(2) (“An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for
sale may be found even though the moment of its making is undetermined.”).
39. See infra Part II.A.
40. See infra Part II.B.
41. See infra Part II.C.
42. See infra Part II.D.
43. See infra Part III.

OSBORN FINAL

2013]

6/24/2013 7:55 PM

THE LEAKY COMMON LAW

153

II. USE OF THE OFFER CONCEPT OUTSIDE OF CONTRACT LAW
As discussed in the preceding section, the contract law
definition of an offer helps balance freedom-from and
freedom-to contract and emphasizes the offeror’s actions and
their effect on the offeree (i.e., the offeree must reasonably
understand that her assent is invited and will conclude the
bargain).
From this, one can make two important
observations about the definition and function of an offer in
contract law: first, it focuses almost exclusively on the offeror
and the offeree, as opposed to third parties or society at large;
and second, contract law asks not simply whether the
purported offer might have piqued the offeree’s commercial
interest, but rather whether it gave her reason to believe she
could conclude the bargain with nothing more than an
acceptance.
The areas of the law outside of contract law that employ
the offer concept44 do so in a dramatically different way.
Contract law’s concerns about freedom-from and freedom-to
contract are minimal. Additionally, outside of contract law
the focus shifts more strongly from particular offerees to
society more generally. Finally, the areas outside of contract
law are more concerned about whether the purported offer
might have piqued the offeree’s commercial interest and less
about whether it gave the offeree reason to believe she could
conclude a bargain. As will be discussed, the new roles for
the offer concept generally result in definitions for the offer
concept that differ from the contract law definition.
A. Trademark Law
The Lanham Act45 is the principle source of federal law
governing trademarks. Trademark law is justified by a
variety of policies, including consumer protection,46 protection
44. I use the phrase offer concept to refer to formal, contract law offers and
less formal commercial promotions (e.g., advertisements and quotes) that would
not qualify as formal offers.
45. Lanham Act §§ 1–45, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–72, 1091–96, 1111–29, 1141–
41n (2006).
46. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic
Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 695, 699 (1997) (“The primary stated purpose for
legal recognition of trademark rights is to prevent consumer confusion. . . .
Consumers . . . use the mark as a signal of the quality of goods, expecting that
goods branded with the mark will be of the quality they have come to associate
with past purchases bearing the mark.”).
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of property,47 and economic efficiency.48 Under the consumer
protection rationale, trademark law protects consumers
against confusion as to the quality and source of certain
goods: consumers associate a trademark with the producer of
those goods, and thus the quality of the goods.49 Under the
property and economic efficiency rationales, trademark law
encourages companies to invest in high quality goods by
protecting consumers’ associations between the high quality
goods and the producer.50 Because the trademark owner can
control who uses the trademark (and thus its associated
consumer goodwill), trademark owners will be willing to
invest in quality goods to build up goodwill.51 Further, under
the efficiency justification, trademarks reduce consumer
search costs when shopping because the trademark serves as
a short-hand identifier of a specific source for desired goods or
services.52
Section 32(1)(a) of the Lanham Act imposes liability on a
person who, without permission, uses a registered mark “in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of any goods or services . . . [if] such use is likely
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive . . . .”53
A quintessential example of trademark infringement is a
person who purposefully sells inferior, non-Coca-Cola soda
with a Coca-Cola label on it. Such a fraudulent sale infringes
47. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 2:2 (4th ed. 1996) (discussing the dual goals of trademark law to
“protect both consumers from deception and confusion over trade symbols and
to protect the plaintiff’s infringed trademark as property”).
48. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An
Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 275 (1987).
49. Burk, supra note 46, at 699–700.
50. Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985)
(“[T]rademarks foster . . . the maintenance of quality by securing to the
producer the benefits of good reputation.”).
51. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995)
(“[Trademark] law helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating
competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a
desirable product. The law thereby ‘encourages[s] the production of quality
products.’ ” (quoting 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.01[1] (3d ed. 1992))).
52. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 n.2
(9th Cir. 1992) (“In economic terms, trademarks reduce consumer search costs
by informing people that trademarked products come from the same source.”);
see Landes & Posner, supra note 48, at 269.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006). The Lanham Act also covers nonregistered
trademarks in § 43, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006).
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the Coca-Cola trademark and implicates trademark law’s
consumer protection and economic efficiency rationales: the
consumer is harmed because it buys the inferior product
believing it is Coca-Cola, the owner of the Coca-Cola
trademark has lost incentive to invest in its brand, and
consumers have less ability to use the name Coca-Cola as
shorthand for a source of a specific good they desire.
The Lanham Act not only precludes actual sales of
infringing (mislabeled) soda, but also invokes the offer
concept and prohibits the offering for sale and advertising of
any goods or services that are likely to cause confusion, even
if those offers and advertisements do not actually lead to
infringing sales.54 By prohibiting infringing advertisements,
the Lanham Act uses the offer concept in a broader manner
than does contract law, which excludes most advertisements
from its offer concept.55
Infringement based on an
advertisement can be found, for example, if the advertisement
promotes counterfeit goods. Rather than having to wait to
bring suit based on an actual sale, the trademark owner may
bring suit based on the advertisement alone if it can
demonstrate that the advertisement is likely to lead to a
confusing sale.56
In addition, courts have identified a second situation
where infringement can be based on an advertisement or offer
to sell. Suppose a fan of Coca-Cola passes by a store with a
large sign that reads, “Cold Coca-Cola brand soda inside,”
but, upon entering the store she is informed by the sales clerk
that the store does not sell Coca-Cola soda, but does offer its
own brand of soda.57 She is thirsty, and having been lured by
the sign mentioning Coca-Cola, might be tempted to buy the
off-brand soda since she has already stopped in and has soda
on her mind. There is no confusion at the time of sale (she
knows it is not Coca-Cola), but the advertisement caused her
to stop in rather than continue walking.
54. See Lanham Act § 32(1)(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).
55. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
56. See 1 JAMES B. ASTRACHAN & DONNA M.D. THOMAS, THE LAW OF
ADVERTISING § 11.02[5][b] (Matthew Bender ed., 2012) (stating that a cause of
action for false advertising under section 32 of the Lanham Act requires, among
other things, a showing of a likelihood of confusion).
57. This hypothetical is borrowed from ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R.
THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND
TRADEMARKS § 29.2.1, at 650–51 (2003).
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In this situation, the advertiser may be liable under a
theory of initial-interest confusion, so named because even
though the consumer is not confused at the time of purchase,
she arguably only became interested because of the
misleading advertisement.58 Courts widely recognize initialinterest confusion as a means by which a trademark owner
can enforce its rights against others.59
Commentators
likewise generally approve of the doctrine in theory, though
they often argue that courts should apply it with more
discretion.60
Trademark law’s consumer protection and economic
efficiency policies suggest that an infringing offer or
advertisement should be prohibited, even if it is not followed
by an infringing sale. If trademark law did not prohibit
advertisements that use another’s trademark, competitors
might bombard buyers with misleading advertisements or
offers. The advertisement or offer harms the consumer by
misleading him61 and diverting his attention and efforts62
58. Id.; see also 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 47, § 23.6
(“[Trademark infringement] can be based upon confusion that creates initial
customer interest, even though no actual sale is finally completed as a result of
the confusion.”). The advertiser might also be liable under other false
advertising and deceptive practices laws. See supra note 31.
59. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 260
(2d Cir. 1987) (recognizing initial interest confusion); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc.
v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 204 (5th Cir. 1998) (same); Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. FluidQuip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v.
Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405–06 (9th Cir. 1997) (same).
60. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and
Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 813–28 (2004)
(arguing, primarily in the internet/metatag context, that initial interest
confusion should apply where advertisers use deception to misdirect customers
to their products, but not where advertisers use another’s trademark to give
consumers additional accurate information); Eric Goldman, Deregulating
Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 559–95 (2005)
(criticizing initial interest confusion in the internet context and proposing
solutions to its shortcomings); Ariel Katz, Beyond Search Costs: The Linguistic
and Trust Functions of Trademarks, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1555, 1593–97 (2010)
(arguing for discernment before applying the doctrine of initial interest
confusion
too
broadly);
Jennifer
E.
Rothman, Initial
Interest
Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
105 (2005) (advocating limits on the initial interest confusion doctrine). But see
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 469–75
(1999) (presenting arguments that the Lanham Act was not intended to
encompass confusion other than as to source).
61. Professor Eisenberg, discussing contract law, anticipates the consumer
harm from false advertisements similar to trademark’s initial interest
confusion. See Eisenberg, supra note 25, at 1167–68 (“Suppose a store
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based on the misrepresentation. The infringing offer or
advertisement likewise dampens the trademark owner’s
incentive to invest in its brand, since it has lost control over
how the mark is used.63 Finally, the infringing offer or
advertisement interrupts the search-cost efficiency that
trademark law seeks to promote because consumers lose the
ability to rely on the trademark as a meaningful identifier.64
Although the Lanham Act specifically includes
advertising within its offer concept, it does not define the
term. Advertising is a potentially broad term that may
include any “action of drawing the public’s attention to
something to promote its sale.”65 Case law interpreting the
Lanham Act has not coalesced around a single definition, and
while widely-distributed commercial promotion clearly
constitutes advertising, courts have struggled with
promotional activities that are distributed less widely or
distributed to an audience other than the final consumers.66
The Lanham Act complicates matters in that while § 32
prohibits advertising, § 43(a)(1)(B) subjects certain
misrepresentations made in commercial advertising or
promotion to liability.67 The majority of courts interpreting
whether an act constitutes advertising under the Lanham Act

advertises 17” Sony TVs at $350, a customer comes in and says he will buy the
TV at that price, and the salesman responds, ‘We’re not selling the set at $350,
but we’ll sell it at $400.’ The reaction of the customer would . . . [be] ‘You people
are liars, cheats, or both.’ ” ).
62. Of course, each individual diversion might be rather small, such as the
customer who takes a minute to stop into the store advertising Coca-Cola. But
the cumulative effect on many consumers could be very great: as some point,
consumers would not trust any billboard, store/restaurant name, advertisement,
etc.
63. See Park ‘n Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985).
64. See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g , Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305
n.2 (9th Cir. 1992).
65. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 55 (7th ed. 1999).
66. See ASTRACHAN & THOMAS, supra note 56, at § 11.02[5][f], at 11-200
n.356 (collecting cases).
67. Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. §1125(a)(1)(B) (2006) (“Any person
who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods,
uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact,
or false or misleading representation of fact, which . . . in commercial
advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or
geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial
activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or
she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.”).
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do so under § 43(a)(1)(B), and while they energetically
suggest a distinction exists between advertising and
promotion, they seldom identify it, except to note that
promotion indicates something broader than traditional
advertising.68 The Second Circuit provided some assistance
when it observed:
[T]he distinction between advertising and promotion lies
in the form of the representation. Although advertising is
generally understood to
consist
of
widespread
communication through print or broadcast media,
‘promotion’ may take other forms of publicity used in the
relevant industry, such as displays at trade shows and
sales presentations to buyers.69

Regardless of the precise line between advertising and
promotion, because § 32 of the Lanham Act prohibits
infringing use in advertisements as well as offers to sell,70 its
offer concept is broader than the contract law definition,
which generally excludes advertisements.71 The Lanham
Act’s broadening of the offer concept to include advertising is
unsurprising in light of the trademark law’s policies: as
shown by the Coca-Cola example above, consumer confusion
and economic inefficiency may result whether the infringing
68. See, e.g., Gmurzynska v. Hutton, 355 F.3d 206, 210 (2d Cir. 2004)
(“[A]lthough representations less formal than those made as part of a classic
advertising campaign may suffice, they must be disseminated sufficiently to the
relevant purchasing public.”); Seven-Up Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 86 F.3d 1379,
1384 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The courts are also in agreement, however, that ‘the Act’s
reach is broader than merely the ‘classic advertising campaign.’ ” (quoting
Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers S.A., STBS, Ltd. v. Am. Inst. of Physics, 859 F.
Supp. 1521, 1534 (S.D.N.Y. 1994))).
69. Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc. v. Fendi USA, Inc., 314 F.3d 48, 57
(2d Cir. 2002). When it comes to deciding what communications can constitute
advertising or promotion, courts vary widely, with some allowing very few
communications to suffice. See ASTRACHAN & THOMAS, supra note 56, at §
11.02, at 11-200 n.356 (collecting cases). Compare First Health Grp. Corp. v.
BCE Emergis Corp., 269 F.3d 800, 803–04 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Advertising is a
form of promotion to anonymous recipients, as distinguished from face-to-face
communication. In normal usage, an advertisement read by millions (or even
thousands in a trade magazine) is advertising, while a person-to-person pitch by
an account executive is not.”), with Seven-Up Co., 86 F.3d at 1382–87 (finding
that the presentation made to eleven bottlers is advertising or promotion), and
Mobius Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Fourth Dimension Software, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 1005,
1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding a single letter actionable under § 43).
70. Lanham Act § 32(1)(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006) (providing for
infringement “in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of any goods or services” (emphasis added)).
71. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
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action is a formal contract law offer or merely an
advertisement.72
B. Securities Act of 1933
One of the primary laws regulating the sale of securities
invokes the offer concept to help regulate certain unwanted
behaviors. Developed in the aftermath of the 1929 stock
market crash, the 1933 Securities Act73 regulates a majority
of public offerings of securities, such as initial public
offerings. The Securities Act’s preamble states that the act
seeks “[t]o provide full and fair disclosure of the character of
securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and
through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof
. . . .”74 To provide full and fair disclosure and thus help
protect investors, the act generally requires offering
companies to file registration statements with the Securities
& Exchange Commission (SEC) that include ample
information about the securities (e.g., via a prospectus),
which in turn helps to “assure that the investor has adequate
information upon which to base his or her investment
decision.”75
The registration statement is one of the most significant
steps a company intending to offer securities must complete,
and the Securities Act uses the offer concept in conjunction
with the registration statement to regulate securities
offerings. For example, the act prohibits the sale of securities
unless a registration statement is in effect for those
securities.76 In addition, the act uses the offer concept to
protect consumers by imposing liability on persons who offer
72. It can be argued that many, if not all, of these concerns could be
addressed by existing laws against false advertising and unfair and deceptive
trade practices. See supra notes 31 and 60.
73. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 1–28, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–bbbb (2006). This
Article focuses on selected provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, but other
statutes provide various forms of protection to investors, such as the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, Trust
Indenture Act of 1939, Investment Company Act of 1940, Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, and the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970.
74. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (preamble) (1934).
75. 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION, § 2.2[1][A], at 214 (West 6th ed. 2009).
76. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1) (“Unless a
registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly . . . to sell such security . . . .”).
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to sell securities before a registration statement is filed.77 In
particular, section 5(c)78 prohibits gun-jumping, which is
offering a security before the issuer, underwriter, or dealer
has filed a registration statement.79
The prohibition of premature offers to sell demonstrates
that Congress felt that regulating only actual sales, to the
exclusion of offers to sell, would not fulfill its goal of providing
adequate protection to investors. Moreover, Congress defined
offer (and offer to sell and offer for sale) more broadly than
the contract law definition and included within the definition
“every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer
to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value.”80 The
definition thus would include advertisements, solicitations,
and other commercializing activities that would fall short of a
contract law offer.
A justification for the offer concept’s broad definition in
the act can be found in the SEC’s decision In re Carl M. Loeb,
Rhoades & Co.:81
The broad sweep of these definitions is necessary to
accomplish the statutory purposes in the light of the
process of securities distribution as it exists in the United
States. Securities are distributed in this country by a
complex and sensitive machinery geared to accomplish
nationwide distribution of large quantities of securities
with great speed. Multi-million dollar issues are often
oversubscribed on the day the securities are made
available for sale. This result is accomplished by a
network of prior informal indications of interest or offers
to buy between underwriters and dealers and between
dealers and investors based upon mutual expectations
that, at the moment when sales may legally be made,
many prior indications will immediately materialize as
77. Id. § 5(3), § 77e(c) (2006) (making it unlawful for “any person . . . to offer
to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any prospectus . . . unless a
registration statement has been filed as to such security” (emphasis added)); see
also id. § 77l(a) (imposing liability on “[a]ny person who . . . offers or sells a
security” in violation of provisions of the Act (emphasis added)); id. § 77q
(regulating those involved in “the offer or sale of any securities or any securitybased swap agreement” against fraudulent interstate transactions (emphasis
added)).
78. Id. § 77e(c).
79. 1 HAZEN, supra note 75, § 2.3[1].
80. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3). The complete
definition is lengthy and will not be reproduced here.
81. In re Carl M. Leob, Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. 843 (1959).
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purchases. It is wholly unrealistic to assume in this
context that ‘offers’ must take any particular legal form.
. . . Under the practices existing prior to the enactment of
the statute in 1933, dealers made blind commitments to
purchase securities without adequate information, and in
turn, resold the securities to an equally uninformed
investing public. The entire distribution process was often
stimulated by sales literature designed solely to arouse
interest in the securities and not to disclose material facts
about the issuer and its securities.82

The Commission went on to state that an offer is
everything that, “even though not couched in terms of an
express offer, condition[s] the public mind or arouse[s] public
interest in the particular securities.”83
While there are exceptions to the broad definition of
offer,84 the statute demonstrates that Congress determined a
need to broaden the offer concept definition beyond contract
law’s definition to adequately protect investors.85 Indeed, by
including in its offer concept not only advertisements, but
also solicitations86 and other attempts to dispose, the Security
Act uses the offer concept more broadly even than § 32 of the
Lanham Act, which does not cover solicitations. The Securitie
Act’s investor protection rationale is analogous to trademark
law’s consumer protection rationale, thus it is unsurprising
that both areas of law define the offer concept more broadly
than does contract law. Although the Securities Act’s offer

82. Id. at 848–49 (footnote omitted).
83. Id. at 850; see also Publication of Information Prior to or After Effective
Date of Registration Statement, Securities Act Release No. 3844, 1 Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 3250–56 (1993) (offering examples of pre-filing publicity that
violated section 5(c)).
84. Most notably, is 17 C.F.R. § 230.135 (2012); see, e.g., 1 HAZEN, supra
note 75, § 2.3[2]; Eric A. Chiappinelli, Gun Jumping: The Problem of Extraneous
Offers of Securities, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 457, 462–63 (1989) (discussing
exceptions, including SEC Rule 135 (17 C.F.R. § 230.135 (1988)), which “allow[]
issuers to announce that they intend to offer securities to be registered under
the Act if the notice is restricted to certain basic information about the issuer
and the issue, and states that the offer will be made only by means of a
prospectus”).
85. See, e.g., 1 HAZEN, supra note 75, § 2.3[2]; Jeffrey A. Brill, Note, “Testing
the Waters”—The SEC’S Feet Go from Wet to Cold, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 464,
477–79 (1998) (discussing the broad definition of offer in the 1933 act).
86. Solicitations include attempts to commercialize that are distributed less
widely than advertisements, and can include one-on-one attempts to gain
business.
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concept is broader in some respects than the Lanham Act’s,
the general logic behind the Securities Act’s expansive
definition of offer parallels that of the Lanham Act: a narrow,
contract law definition would not adequately protect
investors.
C. Endangered Species Act
In 1973, the United States enacted the Endangered
Species Act (ESA),87 in large part to fulfill its obligations
under the newly signed Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).88 The
ESA seeks to “provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon
which endangered species and threatened species depend
may be conserved, [and] to provide a program for the
conservation of such endangered species and threatened
species . . . .”89 As part of its provisions to protect endangered
species, the ESA prohibits, with certain exceptions, a person
from “sell[ing] or offer[ing] for sale in interstate or foreign
commerce” certain endangered species,90 whether the
animal91 is alive or dead.92 Violators may face civil and
87. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2006).
88. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243; see also
Elizabeth R. Beardsley, Poachers with PCs: The United States’ Potential
Obligations and Ability to Enforce Endangered Wildlife Trading Prohibitions
against Foreign Traders Who Advertise on eBay, 25 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
1, 3–7 (2006).
89. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). The Supreme Court has interpreted the ESA
broadly. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 176–84 (1978)
(discussing the temporal and legislative history behind enactment of the ESA
and concluding that “[t]he plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was
to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost. This
is reflected not only in the stated policies of the Act, but in literally every
section of the statute.”).
90. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(F). Numerous other statutes invoke the offer
concept in an effort to protect animals and rare items. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §
668(a) (2006) (making it unlawful to “take, possess, sell, purchase, barter, offer
to sell, purchase or barter, transport, export or import” bald eagles or golden
eagles); 16 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006) (prohibiting, inter alia, “offer[ing] for sale”
migratory birds); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-390(b) (2012) (forbidding the “[sale],
exchange, transport, recei[pt] or offer to sell, [of] any archaeological artifact or
human remains . . . removed from state lands or a state archaeological
preserve”).
91. The statute applies the same prohibitions to plants as well. 16 U.S.C. §
1538(a)(2).
92. Id. § 1532(8) (“The term ‘fish or wildlife’ means any member of the
animal kingdom . . . and includes any part, product, egg, or offspring thereof, or
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criminal penalties.93
Hence, as with the Lanham Act and the 1933 Securities
Act, the ESA prohibits not only sales of endangered species,
but also offers for sale.94 Similarly, in using the offer concept
as a tool to protect endangered animals, the ESA broadens
the definition of offer from its contract law definition.
Specifically, while the statute does not define offer, a
regulation promulgated by the Fish and Wildlife Service
pursuant to the statute provides, “[a]n advertisement for the
sale of endangered wildlife which carries a warning to the
effect that no sale may be consummated until a permit has
been obtained from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service shall
not be considered an offer for sale within the meaning of this
section.”95
Because the regulation exempts a specific type of
advertisement from the definition of offer, by implication all
other advertisements would be offers.96 A prohibition on most
advertisements meshes with common sense: if sales of
endangered animals are not permitted, what business does a
person have advertising such a transaction?97
In addition to the regulation, one judicial decision has
touched on the meaning of offer under the ESA, though
without much elaboration. In United States v. Clark,98 the
Fourth Circuit upheld a conviction of David Clark for, among
other things, offering for sale a Siberian tiger skin rug.99
the dead body or parts thereof.”).
93. See id. § 1540.
94. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(F).
95. 50 C.F.R. § 17.21(f)(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
96. If the statute used offer for sale in the contract law sense, almost no
advertisements would qualify as offers for sale, thus making this regulation
largely superfluous. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text. There is an
alternate interpretation of the regulation: the regulation might be read to mean
that any advertisement that would qualify as an offer to sell under traditional
contract law principles is not an offer to sell if it includes the required warning.
But this reading is less plausible in view of the normal meaning of
advertisement and the very small number of advertisements that qualify as a
contract law offer.
97. Certain sales, e.g., for scientific research, are permissible, provided the
proper permit is obtained. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a). Thus it makes sense to allow
advertisement of those potential transactions, which is precisely why the
regulation allows advertisements containing a caveat that “no sale may be
consummated until a permit has been obtained from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service.” 50 C.F.R. § 17.21(f)(2).
98. 986 F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1993).
99. Id. at 67. Although the rug was not a live animal, the ESA defines
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Unfortunately, it is unclear from the court’s opinion whether
the advertisement was specific enough to constitute an offer
under traditional contract law. The opinion does not provide
the specifics of the advertisements, noting only that Clark
“advertised a Siberian tiger skin rug for sale in the
Washington Post” and that “[o]ther advertisements in several
national newspapers did not specify the kind of tiger.”100 It is
possible that the advertisement could have included specific
language that included price, who could purchase (e.g., first
come, first served), and other essential terms so that it would
qualify as an offer even under traditional contract law.101
Thus, while one cannot be sure whether the advertisement
was specific enough to constitute a contract law offer, one can
at least infer from the lack of discussion about the details of
the advertisement that the court was untroubled by this
question.
It is likely, therefore, that general advertisements would
come within the ESA’s definition of an offer, which would
further the ESA’s goal to protect endangered animals.
Prohibiting only contract law offers but allowing
advertisements would increase the demand for endangered
species,102 thus increasing illegal purchases and threatening
endangered wildlife to include the dead bodies or parts of animals. 16 U.S.C. §
1532(8).
100. Clark, 986 F.2d at 67.
101. See supra note 29.
102. Whether and to what extent advertising increases demand is a matter of
debate. See generally K. Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising, in 3
THE HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1701–44 (M. Armstrong & R.
Porter eds., 2007) (noting the competing views of the roles and effects of
advertisements). While this debate is beyond the scope of this Article, it should
be noted that where perfect information is not available to consumers, as might
be expected in markets where advertisements are illegal, advertising may be
expected to increase demand. Books and articles discussing advertising and
demand are legion. See, e.g., Eliana Garces, The Impact of Behavioral
Economics on Consumer and Competition Policies, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L
145, 148 (2010) (“Neoclassical economics already recognizes the possibility that
a firm invests in advertisement to increase the demand of its product.”);
Sherwin Rosen, Advertising, Information, and Product Differentiation, in
ISSUES IN ADVERTISING: THE ECONOMICS OF PERSUASION 161 (David G. Tuerck
ed., 1978). Interestingly, the Supreme Court has seemed to shift its view on
whether advertising can be presumed to increase demand. Compare Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 569
(1980) (“There is an immediate connection between advertising and demand for
electricity. Central Hudson would not contest the advertising ban unless it
believed that promotion would increase its sales.”), and Posadas de P.R. Assocs.
v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341–42 (1986) (“The Puerto Rico
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to harm endangered animals.
In addition, widespread
advertisement of otherwise prohibited sales would tend to
confuse the public about whether buying the animal is legal
or not. Since it is unlikely that the average rug or garment
purchaser is aware of all the animals covered by the ESA,
allowing such advertisements might lead innocent consumers
to violate the law103 and in turn assist sellers in violating the
law. The confusion would not only harm the endangered
animals by increasing trafficking, but also harm purchasers
ignorant of the law by subjecting them to penalties under the
ESA.
D. Criminal Law
Numerous criminal laws invoke the offer concept by
prohibiting persons from offering to sell various types of
contraband.104 Like the other areas of law discussed in this
Article, many criminal laws expand the offer concept beyond
its contract law definition. For example, to stop the issuance
of false identification cards, Florida and South Carolina laws
make it “unlawful for any person . . . to offer to sell . . . any
identification card or document purporting to contain the age
or date of birth of the person in whose name it was issued”
unless certain restrictions are met.105 Each statute defines
Legislature obviously believed . . . that advertising of casino gambling . . . would
serve to increase the demand for the product advertised. We think the
legislature’s belief is a reasonable one . . . .”), with Greater New Orleans Broad.
Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 189 (1999) (“While it is no doubt fair to
assume that more advertising would have some impact on overall demand for
gambling, it is also reasonable to assume that much of that advertising would
merely channel gamblers to one casino rather than another.”).
103. Purchasers might violate the ESA’s prohibitions against importing,
taking, or receiving endangered animals. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2006).
Further, they may resell the animals unaware of the ESA’s restrictions.
104. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-2.2 (2012) (prohibiting any offer to
sell certain types of bullets); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131N (2012)
(prohibiting any offer to sell certain dangerous weapons that do not resemble
traditional guns); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.224b (2012) (prohibiting any offer to
sell a short-barreled shotgun or rifle); WIS. STAT. § 941.28(2) (2011) (same); see
also Barton Deiters, ‘Joke Ad’ on eBay Offering Tot for Sale Could Land
Prankster in Prison for More Than Two Years, MLIVE.COM (July 21, 2011),
http://www.mlive.com/news/grandrapids/index.ssf/2011/07/joke_ad_on_ebay_offe
ring_tot_f.html (detailing criminal charges brought against a woman for placing
an advertisement on eBay to sell her two-year old cousin). Recall also that the
Endangered Species Act carries the possibility of criminal sanctions. See supra
notes 90–93 and accompanying text.
105. FLA. STAT. § 877.18(1) (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-13-450(1) (2011).
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offer to sell to “include[] every inducement, solicitation,
attempt,” or advertisement by “print[] or media” “to
encourage a person to purchase an identification card.”106
Thus, even though advertisements and other promotions
would not meet the contract law definition of an offer, they
would run afoul of these laws.
Not all statutes define “offer,” however, and few, if any,
cases litigate the issue. While research revealed no United
States cases on the subject, in an English case from 1961,
Fisher v. Bell,107 the government prosecuted Bell for violating
a statute prohibiting the offer for sale of a switchblade
knife.108 Bell had displayed in his store window a switchblade
knife with a tag behind it reading “Ejector knife — 4s.”109
With much reservation, the court held that exhibiting the
knife with the tag did not violate the statute because it was
not an offer for sale under traditional contract law; it was
“merely an invitation to treat.”110 Yet the court noted,
…I think most lay people, and indeed, I myself when I
first read the papers, would be inclined to the view that to
say that if a knife was displayed in a window like that
with a price attached to it was not offering it for sale was
just nonsense.111

Noting that other statutes prohibited not only offering for
sale, but also exposing for sale or similar broad language to
cover invitations to treat, the court assumed that Parliament
knew how to draft statutes to cover activities broader than
contract law offers.112 Finally, the court also stated that “even
if this—and I am by no means saying it is—is a casus omissus
it is not for this court to supply the omission.”113 Indeed,
Parliament soon supplied the omission by amending the
statute to also subject to prosecution anybody who “expose[d]
or has in his possession for the purposes of sale” a
switchblade.114
106. FLA. STAT. § 877.18(2); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-13-450(3).
107. [1961] 1 Q.B. 394. (Eng.)
108. Id. at 395.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 399.
111. Id.
112. Id. See infra notes 213–22 and accompanying text for further discussion
of this statutory interpretation technique.
113. Fisher, [1961] 1 Q.B. at 400.
114. Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1961; 1961 c. 22 (10 Eliz 2).
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Fisher v. Bell thus raises a question: how should U.S.
courts interpret criminal laws that prohibit offers to sell
dangerous weapons (or other contraband) when the statute
does not define offer and does not explicitly prohibit other
activities such as advertisements?
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze the
potential constructions of the offer concept as it appears in
each criminal statute, a few observations are offered.115 To
construe a statute, courts first look to whether the statute
itself defines the term at issue. In some instances, courts
may consult the legislative history.116 Further, since the word
“offer” has a generally accepted common law meaning in the
law of contracts, one canon of statutory construction inserts a
presumption that the common law meaning should prevail117
(this was the Fisher v. Bell rationale). In criminal statutes,
the rule of lenity dictates that courts should interpret
“ambiguities in criminal statutes in favor of the defendant” so
that people are not unfairly subject to criminal penalties.118

Parliament’s reversal of Fisher demonstrates the weakness of the interpretative
cannon that courts should presume common law terms have their common law
meaning even when used in ways dramatically different from their common law
origin.
115. See infra Section III.B for additional discussion of the strengths and
weaknesses of the canons of statutory interpretation.
116. Reviewing each criminal statute’s history is beyond this Article’s scope.
It should be noted that a textualist-oriented judge would be relatively more
reluctant to consult legislative history, but might do so if the statute is
ambiguous (and whether a statute is ambiguous likewise may depend on the
particular judge reviewing it).
117. E.g., Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2245–46 (2011);
Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (“[W]here
a common-law principle is well established, . . . the courts may take it as given
that Congress has legislated with an expectation that the principle will apply
except ‘when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.’ ” (citations omitted)
(quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952))); Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1989) (construing the
term employee in the Copyright Act in view of traditional common law agency
principles).
118. Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 422 (1990), superseded by
statute, Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–647, § 2509, 104 Stat. 4789,
4863 (1990); see also Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25 (2000); Ratzlaf
v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 148–49 (1994), superseded by statute, Riegle
Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 § 411, Pub.
L. No. 103–325, 108 Stat. 2160, 2253 (1994). Closely related is the principle of
legality, which requires that conduct must be criminalized in order to be
punishable. Michael L. Travers, Comment, Mistake of Law in Mala Prohibita
Crimes, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1301, 1320 (1995).
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Applying the rule of lenity in the offer to sell context suggests
a narrow, contract law definition of “offer,” which would
exclude advertisements and other promotions.
Whatever the merits of the various canons of statutory
construction,119 when considering the policies behind these
criminal statutes (e.g., to prevent the spread of contraband),
it strains reason to believe that one who merely advertises or
otherwise commercially promotes a prohibited dangerous
weapon would escape prosecution simply because the
advertisement did not amount to a contract law offer. As
with the advertisement of endangered species by traffickers
discussed in the immediately preceding subsection,
advertisement of contraband serves no legitimate purpose
since the underlying sale is illegal.
Hence, a broader
definition of “offer” under criminal laws comports with the
rationale of deterring certain undesirable behaviors and more
fully protecting society against the harms associated
therewith.
E. Summary
The four very different areas of the law discussed above
demonstrate the extent to which the law is suffused with the
offer concept. Unlike contract law, where the offer concept
helps modulate contract formation, many other areas of the
law use the offer concept to help control certain undesirable
behaviors. In accordance with its new policy role in each area
of the law, the offer concept often takes on a new definition
consonant with its purpose. In some cases, legislatures
provide a specific definition, in others agencies or courts
provide definitional details.
Having surveyed several examples of the offer concept’s
use in the law, this Article now turns to consider patent law’s
relatively recent use of the offer concept to help regulate
infringement. The Article uses patent law as a case study for
an in-depth analysis of the offer concept’s policy role and its
optimal definition in light of that role.

119. See infra note 170 for criticisms of the canons.
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III. A CASE STUDY: THE OFFER CONCEPT AS A POLICY TOOL IN
PATENT LAW
Under authority from the U.S. Constitution, Congress
designed patent laws to promote advances in technology
through the grant of exclusive rights to inventions.120 Patent
law encourages innovation in several ways. First, the grant
of exclusive rights121 to inventions incentivizes invention and
disclosure of inventions by allowing inventors to recoup their
up-front research and development costs, whereas without
exclusivity competitors might easily duplicate the invention
without having to incur the same costs.122 Additionally, the
grant of exclusive rights is believed to induce firms to invest
in commercial exploitation of innovation, which is necessary
to bring inventions to the marketplace.123 Patents have also
been said to encourage competitors to design around existing
patents, thereby generating improvements upon existing
technology and new ways to accomplish the same result.124
While the above-mentioned instrumentalist/utilitarian
justifications of the patent system have recently dominated
American patent law,125 others assert natural rights-based (or

120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the right “[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . .
Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.”).
121. Among other rights, a United States patent confers the exclusive right
to make, use, offer to sell, and sell the invention set forth in the patent claims.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
122. E.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024–30
(1989); Lucas Osborn, Tax Strategy Patents: Why the Tax Community Should
Not Exclude the Patent System, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 325, 331 (2008).
123. E.g., F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for
Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 707–12 (2001); Edmund W.
Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276–
77 (1977).
124. F. SCOTT KIEFF, PAULINE NEWMAN, HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ & HENRY E.
SMITH, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 71 (5th ed. 2011).
125. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) (“The patent
laws promote this progress by offering inventors exclusive rights for a limited
period as an incentive for their inventiveness and research efforts.”); Julie E.
Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software
Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 50 (2001) (describing the patent system’s central
task as utilitarian in nature); Kieff, supra note 123, at 697–98 (“Although
rights-based theories do influence debates about intellectual property theory in
general, the consensus among those studying the American patent system is to
focus on utilitarian approaches.”); see Kitch, supra note 123, at 265–71
(describing a utilitarian prospect theory of patents).
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deontological) justifications. The primary natural rights
argument in patent law is usually based on an extrapolation
of the Lockean labor-desert theory under which inventors
should be awarded patents based on the labor expended or
the value added to society.126 A second major strand of
natural rights theory is based on a personhood theory,
typically derived from a Hegelian actualization theory, in
which intellectual property serves as an extension of the
author’s personality.127 As applied to patent law, the labordesert theory is typically accepted as a superior justification
than the personhood theory since it is more intuitive to think
of a copyrighted poem being an extension of one’s personality
than a patented microchip.128
With these background justifications for patent law in
mind, this Article will consider the offer concept’s use as a
tool to help regulate patent infringement. It should be noted
that American patent law has not always used the offer
Although from its
concept to regulate infringement.129
beginnings American law has given the patent holder the
exclusive right to make, use, and sell the invention in the
United States,130 American patent law did not make an
126. E.g., Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality
and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J.
1533, 1540–83 (1993); see Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual
Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 296–330 (1988).
127. E.g., Hughes, supra note 126, at 330–65; see Margaret Jane Radin,
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
128. Hughes, supra note 126, at 341–42; see Roberta Rosenthal Kwall,
Originality in Context, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 871, 874–75 (2007). But see Mark A.
Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873,
880 (1997) (reviewing JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996), noting the
American romantic view of inventors); Henry Sauermann & Wesley M. Cohen,
What Makes Them Tick? Employee Motives and Firm Innovation, 56 MGMT. SCI.
2134 (2010).
129. Acts of direct infringement include the unauthorized making, using,
selling, or offering for sale the invention within the United States or importing
of a patented invention into the United States during the term of the patent. 35
U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). For a court to find infringement, the plaintiff must show
that every element (or its substantial equivalent) listed in a patent’s claim is
present in the accused device. See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997); Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538 (Fed.
Cir. 1985).
130. See Patent Act of 1790, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 §1 (repealed 1793)
(granting the “sole and exclusive right and liberty of making, constructing,
using and vending to others” the invention); 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1952) (amended
1996) (providing that any unauthorized making, using, or selling of a patented
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unauthorized offer to sell an act of infringement until the
mid-1990s.131 As part of the international harmonization of
intellectual property laws under the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) agreement,132 in 1994 Congress
added a provision to 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) making an offer to sell
infringing technology an independent act of patent
infringement.133 Before this amendment, a mere offer to sell
would not infringe a patent’s claims, whereas an actual sale
would.134 Despite the radical change in the law adding
infringement for an offer to sell, Congress gave almost no
instruction about the intent or meaning of the new invocation
of the offer concept.135
Given that the offer concept is available as a tool to
regulate patent infringement in the United States, the
remainder of this section analyzes that tool. The first
subsection analyzes the offer concept in patent law strictly
from a policy perspective and provides a normative assertion
for its proper scope. An analysis of the statutory text and
context is reserved for the second subsection.136

invention is an act of infringement).
131. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
132. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
Annex 1C Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS), art. 28, § 1(a), Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; 33 I.L.M. 1197
(“Article 28 . . . A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights:
. . . to prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent from the acts of: . . .
offering for sale”).
133. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (“[W]hoever . . . offers to sell . . . within the
United States . . . any patented invention . . . infringes the patent.”). The
statute became effective January 1, 1996. See also Uruguay Round Agreements
Act, H.R. 5110, 103d Cong. § 101(d)(15) (1994) (approving TRIPS).
134. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994); Lang v. Pac. Marine & Supply Co., 895
F.2d 761, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that § 271 “by itself, cannot be
interpreted to cover acts other than an actual making, using or selling of the
patented invention”).
135. See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1252 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (“Unfortunately, other than stating that an ‘offer to sell’ includes only
those offers ‘in which the sale will occur before the expiration of the term of the
patent,’ Congress offered no other guidance as to the meaning of the phrase. . . .
[T]he legislative history of the statute offers little additional insight.” (citation
omitted) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(i) (Supp. 1997))).
136. While this order of analysis (policy first, statute second) may be the
reverse of what a person engaged in statutory construction might follow, this
Article is concerned with what the offer concept’s role should be as well as what
its role is.
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A. The Optimal Scope of Patent Law’s Offer Concept in View
of its Underlying Policies
The scope of patent law’s offer concept could fall
anywhere on a spectrum from a narrow, contract law
definition to a far broader definition that includes almost any
communication of an intent to commercialize. One can
identify several points of interest along the spectrum, such as
the following, listed in order from narrowest to broadest:
Contract Law Definition: While various permutations
exist, the definition in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS suffices: an offer is a “manifestation of
willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify
another person in understanding that his assent to that
bargain is invited and will conclude it.”137
Advertisements: Moving toward a broader definition, the
offer concept could include not only contract law offers, but
also advertisements, which can be loosely defined as
widespread communication through the Internet or print
or broadcast media designed to attract commercial
interest.138
Promotions: This category includes commercializing
activities that are not as widely or formally distributed as
traditional advertising, such as displays at trade shows,
face-to-face solicitations (such as sales presentations to
buyers), price lists, and circular letters.139

Determining where on this spectrum patent law’s offer
concept should fall requires a consideration of the purposes
that the offer concept serves in section 271(a) of the Patent
Act.
1. The Policy of Preventing Third Parties from Harming
Patentees by Generating Interest in an Infringing
Product
The Federal Circuit has primarily discussed a single
objective behind the offer concept in section 271(a). In its
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981).
138. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 25 (4th ed. 2000) (defining advertisement as “[a] notice, such as a
poster or a paid announcement in the print, broadcast, or electronic media,
designed to attract public attention or patronage”).
139. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text (discussing distinctions
between advertising and promotion).
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first case interpreting the language the court stated that
“[o]ne of the purposes of adding ‘offer[] to sell’ to § 271(a) was
to prevent . . . [a competitor from] generating interest in a
potential infringing product to the commercial detriment of
the rightful patentee.”140 This policy has been affirmed by
subsequent decisions, and recently the court referred to it as
the policy, not just a policy (though this may have been an
instance of unintentionally loose language).141 Similarly, the
leading patent treatise emphasizes this policy.142
i.

Comparison to Contract Law

Assuming patent law’s offer concept primarily serves to
prevent improper commercialization that harms the patentee,
one can gain insight into its optimal scope by comparing this
policy rationale to the policies behind other uses of the offer
concept. As a first area of comparison, recall that the offer
concept in contract law is governed in large part by a policy to
strengthen freedom from contract and preserve individual
autonomy.143 To accomplish this policy, contract law creates
friction between the offeror and offeree by setting the bar for
an offer relatively high—it must put the power of acceptance
into the offeree, and thus excludes most advertisements and
other promotions.144
But contract law’s focus on freedom from contract and the
offeror’s and offeree’s autonomy bears little relationship to

140. 3D Sys. v. Aarotech Labs. Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
141. Compare MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon
Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting the statement in 3D Sys.
that “ ‘[o]ne of the purposes of adding ‘offer[] to sell’ to section 271(a) was to
prevent . . . generating interest in a potential infringing product to the
commercial detriment of the rightful patentee’ ” (emphasis added)), with
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc.,
617 F.3d 1296, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The underlying purpose of holding
someone who offers to sell liable for infringement is to prevent ‘generating
interest in a potential infringing product to the commercial detriment of the
rightful patentee.’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting 3D Sys., 160 F.3d at 1379)).
Nothing in the Transocean decision indicates this shift from a to the was
intentional.
142. 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.02[5][g], at 16–104
(Matthew Bender 2010) (“[T]he policy underlying a patentee’s statutory right to
exclude unauthorized sales and offers to sell [is] to prevent others from deriving
commercial advantage from the invention without compensating the patent
owner.”).
143. See supra Part I.
144. See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text.
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the patent infringement context.
While in traditional
contract law an offer must be met with an acceptance to
invoke state oversight of (and potential imposition on) private
ordering,145 in patent law the government has already
granted the patentee the power of exclusivity against
competitors, and the infringer does not escape liability based
on ignorance of the patent.146 Thus, in the patent context,
unlike in the contract context, the offer does not lead to the
law creating completely new rights and obligations between
two parties, but rather is compensating a patentee based on
its pre-existing right of exclusivity.
Further, unlike contract law where the focus is largely on
the effect of an offer on the offeree, in patent law the focus
shifts in large part to the effect of the offer on the patentee.
While patent law retains a modicum of focus on the offeree in
that the offer must generate an offeree’s commercial interest
in the infringing product,147 piquing an audience’s commercial
interest is a lower standard than contract law’s insistence
that the offeree understand she can conclude the bargain
with a simple acceptance.
Indeed, activities such as
advertisements and other promotions can generate interest in
an infringing product and harm the patentee even though
they are not contract law offers.
Initially, it may seem that an offer to sell an infringing
product, if not eventually consummated by a sale, would not
harm the patentee. Yet a competitor’s advertisement or
promotion of an infringing product at a lower price148 than the
patentee charges will potentially cause price erosion, as the
patentee must adjust its price to compete with the infringer
and/or forgo future price increases.149 This harm is most
145. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
146. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006) (“Every patent shall contain . . . a grant
to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making,
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States
. . . .” (emphasis added)).
147. See supra notes 140–42 and accompanying text.
148. Indeed, even if a price is not mentioned, the mere appearance of
competition could cause downward price pressure.
149. See, e.g., Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk
Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Timothy R.
Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a Sale:” Assessing Patent Infringement for
Offering to Sell an Invention and Implications for the On-Sale Patentability Bar
and Other Forms of Infringement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751, 791–92 (2003));
David Bohrer et al., The Shifting Sands of Price Erosion: Price Erosion
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apparent and direct where the patentee (1) is practicing the
invention150 and (2) has market power to charge a premium
for the patented product (i.e., there are no adequate noninfringing alternatives).151
Where the patentee is not
practicing the invention, she is still entitled to a reasonable
royalty,152 which must have some value, however small, since
the infringer obviously valued the right to offer the product
for sale as evidenced by its actual offer.
Because price erosion, which harms the patentee, can
result from commercializing activities that fall short of a
contract law offer, patent law’s offer concept should be
defined to include commercializing activities to the extent
they have the ability to affect price erosion.153 The definition
should include advertising since it is the activity most likely
to cause price erosion. Indeed, advertising, which is by
definition widespread, is more likely to cause price erosion
than isolated contract law offers. Further, the definition
should include promotions that do not qualify as formal
advertising, since promotional activities such as circular
letters and person-to-person solicitations are capable of
causing price erosion.
Of course, not all advertisements or promotional
activities will cause price erosion, as where they do not reach
a significant portion of the market. Thus, one might be
tempted to exclude them from patent law’s offer concept. But
Damages Shift by Tens of Millions of Dollars Depending Upon the Admissibility
of Pre-Notice Eroded Prices, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 723
(2009); Robert S. Frank, Jr. & Denise W. DeFranco, Patent Infringement
Damages: A Brief Summary, 10 FED. CIR. B.J. 281, 287–88 (2000).
150. Practicing the invention refers to a patentee that either sells the product
himself or has others (e.g., licensees) sell on his behalf. If the patentee is not
practicing the invention, price fluctuations will not harm him.
151. See Holbrook, supra note 149, at 792. In the case of a market with
noninfringing alternatives (e.g., a nail as a substitute for a patented screw), a
patentee will tend to have market power and the ability to charge a premium
until an infringing offer lessens this power.
Where the noninfringing
alternative is a perfect substitute (i.e., it performs as well as or better than the
patented product at a similar or lower price), the patentee will have no market
power regardless of infringing offers (assuming a well-functioning market) and
price erosion will not be a cognizable harm.
152. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) mandates a minimum damage award of a
reasonable royalty, calculated based on a hypothetical contractual negotiation
that might have taken place between the patentee and the infringer at a time
just before infringement occurred. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d
1538, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
153. See Holbrook, supra note 149, at 788–800.
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excluding these commercializing activities would be underinclusive: the commercializing activities will affect the
market price at least some of the time, but a per se exclusion
would render the patent holder unable to recover even where
it can prove damages. Instead, the better option is to include
these commercializing activities within the offer concept.154
While the harm from price erosion may at times be small or
difficult to prove (and in fact may not exist at all), this
concern is more properly addressed by requiring the patent
holder to prove its damages with reasonable certainty.155
In sum, a comparison of contract law’s policies
underlying its offer concept to patent law’s policy of
preventing detrimental commercial interest in infringing
products suggests that the patent law offer concept should be
broader than the contract law concept.
ii. Comparison to Other Areas of the Law
To further inform the proper scope of patent law’s offer
concept, one can compare the policies behind other uses of the
offer concept to patent law’s policy of preventing third parties
from generating commercial interest in infringing products to
the patentee’s detriment.
The Lanham Act’s policy of protecting a trademark
owner’s investment in high quality goods provides
particularly interesting parallels to infringement for an offer
154. Courts should not, however, make offers to buy or mere inquiries by
buyers acts of infringement because they would not commercially harm the
patentee—they would, if anything, be likely to drive up the price of the patented
goods by indicating an increase in demand, not supply. Thus, inquiries by
buyers are excluded from the terms solicitations and other promotional
activities as used herein.
155. Even formal contract law offers will not always result in provable price
erosion. Patent damages are governed primarily by 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
One option would be to craft a detailed definition of the offer concept that would
only include those promotions likely to cause price erosion (e.g., by correlating it
to how widely the promotional activities are distributed compared to the
purchasing audience). On the other hand, finely tuning the definition will be
difficult ex ante. If the definition of an offer encompasses most promotional
activities, the cost of fine tuning (i.e., determining whether there is actual
damage) shifts to each patentee. Allowing cases of price erosion to reach a fact
finder will increase litigation costs, but presumably a patent holder would only
pursue damages if it had some reasonable likelihood of success; otherwise it
would be wasting its money on its own litigation expenses. In addition, a patent
holder could pursue injunctive relief. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006). Courts can
exercise their equitable discretion in deciding whether to grant injunctive relief.
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006).

OSBORN FINAL

2013]

6/24/2013 7:55 PM

THE LEAKY COMMON LAW

177

to sell in patent law. In both cases, the right holder
(trademark or patent) is harmed by a competitor’s activity (an
advertisement) that is directed toward buyers. In both cases,
a mere advertisement, even if not followed by a formal offer
or sale, may be enough to harm the right holder. Thus, the
parallels between the goals of § 32 of the Lanham Act and
§ 271(a) of the Patent Act suggest that patent law’s offer
concept should mirror the Lanham Act’s by including at least
advertisements in its definition.
Further, patent law’s policy against improper generation
of commercial interest markedly resembles the Securities
Act’s recognition that any activity that “arouses public
interest”156 in securities can harm investors. While patent
law’s focus rests primarily on the patentee as opposed to the
Securities Act’s focus on investors, both laws concern the
same essential problem, i.e., an entity improperly arousing or
generating interest in a thing being commercialized. The
Securities Act’s recognition that offers to sell, advertisements,
and even smaller-scale solicitations can generate public
interest157 suggests a broad scope for patent law’s offer
concept.
Similarly, the Endangered Species Act provides an
interesting comparison to the Patent Act. Both statutes
include a prohibition against offers to sell without defining
the term and both statutes were enacted to comply with
international agreements.158 The ESA’s offer concept does not
focus on whether the offeree can conclude the bargain (the
contract law focus). Rather, it focuses on the potential harm
a third party (an endangered species) may incur from the
commercialization of the endangered species.159 Because
advertisements would tend to increase illegal animal
trafficking, the ESA defines offers to include most
advertisements.160 The ESA’s shift of focus from the offeree to
the effect on external entity loosely mirrors the Patent Act’s
focus on preventing harm to the patent holder. Similarly, the
156. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text.
158. See supra Part II.C (discussing the ESA). Interpretations of offer to sell
in the ESA have not discussed the ESA’s international heritage. As to the
potential impact of the Patent Act’s international character on interpretation of
offer to sell, see infra Part III.B.2.
159. See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text.
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ESA’s recognition that advertising will affect animal
trafficking markets and harm endangered species suggests
that patent law’s offer concept should be defined to include
advertising since advertising can affect the market for the
patented technology and harm the patentee.
2. Additional Policies Behind Making an Offer to Sell an
Act of Patent Infringement
Courts have posited additional rationales for including
offer to sell as an act of infringement. Most broadly, the
Federal Circuit noted that Congress added the language to
strengthen patent holders’ protections under § 271.161 At
least one court described the purpose of adding offer to sell
was to allow a patentee to sue at an earlier time.162 The court
stated that § 271(i)’s definition of an offer to sell as “ ‘that in
which the sale will occur before the expiration of the patent’
. . . makes it clear that Congress intended the ‘offer to sell’
language to push back the point in time at which the
competitor’s activity is an act of infringement.”163 Each of
these purposes is accurate, but each is unhelpful in
pinpointing which activities should count as an offer to sell,
since any definition would strengthen patent holders’ rights
and allow an earlier suit164 compared to infringement for a
161. Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1252 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (citing General Agreement On Tariffs And Trade (GATT): Intellectual
Property Provisions: Hearings on H.R. 4894 and S. 2368 Before the Subcomm.
on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House Judiciary
Comm. and the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate
Judiciary Comm., 103rd Cong. 124 (1994) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of
Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Comm’r of Patents and
Trademarks) (stating that the amendments “ ‘add to the rights of the patent
owner’ ” ).
162. Quality Tubing, Inc. v. Precision Tube Holdings Corp., 75 F. Supp. 2d
613, 623 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (“The language of the statute and the cases make it
clear that expanding the list of infringing activities in sections 271(a) . . .
protects a patent holder at an earlier stage of infringing activity. The patent
holder no longer has to wait for an actual infringing sale before filing suit.”).
163. Id. at 624 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(i) (2000)).
164. Regarding the Quality Tubing court’s emphasis on 271(i)’s timing
provision, note that advertisements and individual solicitations may
contemplate sales that will occur before the patent’s expiration. One could
interpret § 271(i)’s requirement to mean that the offer must specify a projected
completion date or else it does not infringe. Even this stringent interpretation
would be both under- and over-inclusive: some contract law offers would not
infringe (if the offers did not specify a completion date) and some advertising
and solicitations would infringe (e.g., an advertisement good for one week only).
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completed sale.
Further, applying a labor-desert theory165 to the offer
concept, one could argue that a third party should not be
permitted to trespass upon the inventor’s justly-secured
patent right. On this theory, the inventor’s provision of value
to society via her invention results in her natural right to a
patent, and that right should not be invaded by another’s
offering to sell the invention. This argument would lead to a
broadly defined offer concept because the inventor’s natural
right to the patent should be protected against unjustified
trespass, regardless of whether the invasion causes economic
harm to the patentee.
Moreover, the offer concept may play a role in buyer166
protection. Though this policy was not likely at the forefront
of the change to § 271(a), the prohibition on offers to sell
infringing technology adds a layer of protection to purchasers
of patented technology. A purchaser of infringing technology,
even if ignorant of the infringement, will become an infringer
if it uses, sells, offers to sell, or imports the purchased
technology within the United States.167 Hence, to the extent a
broad offer concept will lead to less commercialization of
infringing technology, it can in turn protect innocent
purchasers from future liability for infringement.
Finally, the Federal Circuit has stated that Congress
added infringement for an offer to sell to harmonize U.S.
patent law with that of the international community.168
While TRIPS certainly intended to harmonize the broad
contours of intellectual property law (including patent law),
the extent to which TRIPS intended detailed harmonization
is debated.169 In any event, this Article reserves a discussion
165. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
166. The word buyer is used instead of consumer to reflect the fact that many
purchasers of patented technology are businesses rather than individual
consumers.
167. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
168. Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1253 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (“[W]e must recognize one of the agreements’ declared purposes:
harmonizing worldwide patent law.” (citing Lisa B. Martin & Susan L. Amster,
International Intellectual Property Protections in the New GATT Accord, 2 J.
PROPRIETARY RTS. 9, 9 (1993))); see also Hearings, supra note 161 (“With its
signing in Marrakech, we established international standards for the protection
and enforcement of intellectual property that were unthinkable only a decade
ago.”).
169. See infra notes 207–10 and accompanying text.
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of the consequences of TRIPS’ international character for
Section III.B.2 below.
B. The Scope of Patent Law’s Offer Concept in View of the
Canons of Statutory Construction
While the preceding subsection focused solely on policy
analysis, this subsection will analyze the meaning of patent
law’s offer concept in light of the canons of statutory
construction. This analysis will not be exhaustive, but will
discuss the more salient interpretive issues. Courts and
scholars perpetually debate the rules (and whether rules
exist) for statutory construction,170 with strict textualists
refusing to go beyond the statutory language171 and the
liberal purposivist looking at legislative history, context, and
policy.172 Others (most famously Karl Llewellyn) criticize the
idea that statutory canons can assist in an objective statutory
construction.173 This Article does not enter that debate, and
instead analyzes the language, history, context, and policy174
170. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87
MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 533 (1983); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in
Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 63–64 (1994); William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479
(1987); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621
(1990); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy,
78 GEO. L.J. 281 (1989); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800 (1983); Nicholas Quinn
Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085
(2002).
171. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“Although it is true that the Court in recent times has [allowed
legislative history to sometimes trump plain meaning], that is to my mind an
ill-advised deviation from the venerable principle that if the language of a
statute is clear, that language must be given effect—at least in the absence of a
patent absurdity.”).
172. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979)
(“As in all cases of statutory construction, our task is to interpret the words of
these statutes in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve.”).
173. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate
Decisions and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3
VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–03 (1950); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43
HARV. L. REV. 863, 885 (1930).
174. This Article analyzed the policies undergirding the offer concept in the
preceding Part III.A. The Supreme Court has looked at policy to guide its
decisions in patent cases. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 532 (1966)
(“Since we find no specific assistance in the legislative materials underlying §
101, we are remitted to an analysis of the problem in light of the general intent
of Congress, the purposes of the patent system, and the implications of a
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without commenting on the appropriateness or inherent
weight that each source carries.
1. The Meaning of “Offer to Sell” in View of the Statute’s
Text
An oft-cited rule of statutory construction instructs
courts to start with the words of the statute.175 Of course,
starting with the words does not necessarily mean ending
with the words. Judges leaning toward stricter textualism
would say that if the text’s meaning is clear, courts “must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.”176 Other judges might say only that the text’s
meaning should be given priority in construction.177 If judges
agree to start with the words, an additional rule of statutory
construction directs that Congress should be presumed to
have intended words to carry their ordinary meaning.178
Perhaps inevitably, judges differ widely regarding whether,
and how to determine whether, a set of words has an ordinary
meaning and is unambiguous. If the text’s meaning is not
clear, most judges would resort to other sources for
interpretation, including other words of the statute and the
legislative history.179
i.

The Meaning of “Offer to Sell” in the Law in 1994

The words offer to sell in 38 U.S.C. § 271(a) arguably do
not have a plain and ordinary meaning, as demonstrated by
the various ways Congress has defined the phrase180 and the
disparity between the traditional contract law meaning

decision one way or the other.”).
175. See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739
(1989) (“The starting point for our interpretation of a statute is always its
language.”).
176. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843 (1984). Note that the Chevron court discusses whether the intent
is clear, not necessarily the text.
177. See, e.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. FCC, 665 F.2d 1126, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(“[A] statute’s plain meaning should be given priority in its construction.”).
178. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2245 (2011).
179. See Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 162 (1991) (“ ‘[W]e look first to the
statutory language and then to the legislative history if the statutory language
is unclear.’ ” (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984))).
180. See supra Part II (analyzing the offer concept as used in various areas of
the law).
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compared to the lay-person’s understanding.181 Where the
meaning of a text is not plain, other rules of construction may
be used.
One such rule directs that since the phrase “offer to sell”
is a common law term, courts “assume the ‘term . . . comes
with a common law meaning, absent anything pointing
another way.’ ” 182 In Microsoft Corp. v. i4i, the Supreme Court
recently applied this rule of construction in the patent context
to support the rationale that the directive that a patent shall
be presumed valid means it can only be invalidated by clear
and convincing evidence.183 The court noted that over 100
years of patent decisions had settled on a meaning of
presumed valid, and thus Congress should be presumed to
have intended the settled meaning of that phrase when it
used it in the 1952 Patent Act.184
If one assumes that the common law meaning of “offer to
sell” refers to its meaning in the common law of contracts,
then applying this rule to § 271(a) suggests that the definition
of “offer to sell” would exclude most advertisements and
promotions, unless there is anything pointing another way.185
Starting with the remaining text in § 271, nothing appears to
alter the common law definition, other than § 271(i)’s
requirement that the offer be one for which the sale would not
occur after the expiration of the patent at issue.186 There is,
181. See supra note 24. The Federal Circuit considers the phrase offer to sell
in § 271(a) to be ambiguous. See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d
1246, 1252 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (consulting the legislative history behind § 271(a)
after stating that “[w]hen the language of a statute fails to provide clear and
unambiguous direction, we may turn to the statute’s legislative history”).
182. Microsoft Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2245–46 (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 58 (2007)); accord Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
490 U.S. 730, 739 (“It is, however, well established that ‘[w]here Congress uses
terms that have accumulated settled meaning under . . . the common law, a
court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to
incorporate the established meaning of these terms.’ ” ); see also supra note 117.
183. Microsoft Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2245–48.
184. See id. at 2245–47.
185. There is disagreement whether the “anything pointing the other way”
must come from the statute itself or may also include the legislative history or
extrinsic considerations. See id. at 2249 n.8 (“For those of us for whom it is
relevant, the legislative history of § 282 provides additional evidence that
Congress meant to codify the judge-made presumption of validity, not to set
forth a new presumption of its own making.” (emphasis added)).
186. 35 U.S.C. § 271(i) (2006). While the phrase offer to sell appears in other
sections of the patent statutes, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1), Congress inserted the
phrase in those sections at the same time as adding it to § 271, and these
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however, a notable difference between the use of “offer to sell”
in § 271(a) and the term presumed valid discussed in
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i. Specifically, the term “presumed valid”
had accumulated a settled meaning in patent cases before its
use in the patent statute, whereas the term offer to sell as
applied to infringement187 had not been used in patent cases
before it was added to § 271. Thus, any presumption would
seem to apply with stronger force in the Microsoft Corp. v. i4i
case.
Moreover, the canon that the common law meaning
should be presumed is based on an assumption that a term
has a single meaning in the law. But when a term has
evolved new and different meanings over time or in certain
areas of the law, the presumption must take account of those
meanings. The Supreme Court demonstrated this flexible
approach in Perrin v. United States,188 a case interpreting
whether the term “bribery” in the Travel Act was limited to
inducement of public officials, or whether it also included
inducement of private employees.189 The Perrin Court noted
that, at early common law, the term “bribery” only applied to
the corruption of judges or other public officials.190 But the
Court stated that the meaning that mattered for statutory
construction purposes was its meaning in 1961, when
Congress enacted the Travel Act.191 The Perrin Court decided
that the term bribery was broader than its traditional
common law meaning because “by the time the Travel Act
was enacted in 1961, federal and state statutes had extended
the term bribery well beyond its common law meaning.”192
Applying the Perrin Court’s logic to the phrase “offer to
sell” in § 271(a) suggests a broader meaning than the contract
law definition. Part II of this Article examined numerous
statutes (all enacted before offer to sell was added § 271(a))193
that used the term “offer to sell” in a broader way than its
appearances do not further inform the meaning.
187. As discussed below in Part III.B.1.ii, the phrase offer to sell had been
used in cases concerning § 102(b) of the Patent Act.
188. 444 U.S. 37 (1979).
189. Id. at 38–41.
190. Id. at 43.
191. Id. at 42.
192. Id. at 43.
193. Recall that § 271(a) was amended in 1994 to include liability for an offer
to sell.
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contract law meaning. Thus, just as federal and state
statutes had broadened the term bribery by the time of the
Travel Act’s enhancement in 1961, so had federal and state
statutes broadened the term offer to sell by the time of
§ 271(a)’s amendment in 1994.194 Hence, courts should
presume that Congress intended the broader meaning of
“offer to sell” to apply to § 271(a).
ii. The Meaning of “On Sale” in Patent Law in 1994
In addition to the statutes discussed in Part II, judicial
treatment in 1994 of the term on sale in § 102(b)195 of the
Patent Act recommends a meaning of “offer to sell” that is
broader than the contract law definition. Section 102(b)
provides that an inventor cannot obtain a patent if “the
invention was . . . on sale in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United
States.”196 Thus, if the inventor puts her invention on sale,
she must apply for a patent within one year or else she will be
barred from obtaining a patent. Courts have recognized
several policies underlying the § 102(b) on-sale bar, including
(1) preventing inventors from commercializing their
inventions while delaying applying for a patent, (2) reluctance
to allow an inventor to remove existing knowledge from
public use, (3) encouraging prompt and widespread disclosure
of inventions to the public, and (4) giving investors a
reasonable period to discern the potential value of an
invention.197
The phrase “on sale” is arguably similar enough to “offer
to sell” to inform its meaning.198 While one might argue that
194. See supra Part II.
195. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). See infra note 196 (discussing 2011
amendments to § 102(b)).
196. § 102(b) (emphasis added). Note that the America Invents Act will
retain the on sale verbiage in what will be the new §102(a)(1). Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, § 3(b) (enacted Sept. 16,
2011). The new § 102 will become effective eighteen months after enactment,
i.e., March 16, 2013. Id. at § 3(n).
197. E.g., 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 n.4 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (listing policies underlying the on-sale bar); see also Pfaff v. Wells
Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63–64 (1998).
198. Further, the on-sale bar’s policy against allowing inventors to
commercialize their inventions while delaying a patent application recalls §
271(a)’s policy of preventing a competitor from commercializing infringing
technology to the commercial harm of the patentee.
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different phrases should be presumed to have different (but
perhaps overlapping) meanings, it is also argued that a
similar term within a statute can inform construction of a
related term.199 Assuming without deciding that § 102(b) can
help construe § 271(a),200 this Article briefly considers the
meaning of on sale under § 102(b).
When Congress amended § 271(a) in 1994, courts
interpreted the phrase “on sale” in § 102(b) of the Patent Act
as referring to an “offer to sell,” but used the phrase offer to
sell to mean something broader than the contract law
meaning.201 Specifically, during and before 1994, the Federal
Circuit understood that an item would be considered on sale
under § 102(b) when it was subject to a definite offer to sell,
but that a definite offer to sell could be shown “by a patentee’s
commercial activity which does not rise to the level of a
formal ‘offer’ under contract law principles.”202 Thus, at the
time Congress used the phrase “offer to sell” in § 271(a),
Federal Circuit decisions used that phrase as synonymous
with “on sale” and interpreted both phrases as including
advertisements and price quotes.203 This supports the notion
199. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747
(1999).
200. The Federal Circuit has equivocated somewhat on the extent to which
102(b)’s on-sale bar should influence § 271(a). Compare 3D Sys., 160 F.3d at
1379 n.4 (stating that because the policies governing the two sections have “no
resonance” with each other, the court “decline[s] to import the authority
construing the ‘on sale’ bar of § 102(b) into the ‘offer to sell’ provision of § 271(a)
. . . . Thus, ‘offer to sell’ under § 271 cannot be treated as equivalent to ‘on sale’
under § 102(b).”), with Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246,
1254 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that the policies behind the two sections differ,
while stating that “the analysis of an ‘offer to sell’ under § 271(a) is consistent
with the [Supreme] Court’s analysis in Pfaff of § 102(b)”).
201. RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“[A]
definite offer to sell is an essential requirement of the on-sale bar . . . [but the]
requirement of a definite offer excludes merely indefinite or nebulous discussion
about a possible sale. While this requirement may be met by a patentee’s
commercial activity which does not rise to the level of a formal ‘offer’ under
contract law principles, a definite offer in the contract sense clearly meets this
requirement.” (citations omitted)).
202. Id.; accord In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter
Patent Litig., 71 F.3d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[W]hether a device has been
placed on sale is not subject to a mechanical rule. . . . Our court has stressed
that commercialization is the central focus for determining whether the
patented invention has been placed on sale.” (citations omitted)); Sonoscan, Inc.
v. Sonotek, Inc., 936 F.2d 1261, 1263–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (discussing the price
quote as sufficient to trigger the on-sale bar).
203. Beginning in 2001, the Federal Circuit adopted a different
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that Congress intended the phrase “offer to sell” to encompass
advertisements and related promotional activities.
2. The Meaning of “Offer” in View of its Legislative
History and Adoption Pursuant to an
International Treaty
The legislative history provides almost no instruction
about the intent or meaning of the term “offer” in § 271(a).204
As discussed, Congress added offer to sell as an act of
infringement pursuant to the TRIPS agreement.205 Further,
the context surrounding the statutory amendment suggests
that Congress added the language to strengthen patent
holders’ protections under § 271 and to align U.S. patent law
more closely with that of the international community.206
Although TRIPS more closely aligned international
patent (and other intellectual property) laws, it did not
mandate standardization of international patent law. TRIPS
requires countries to enact certain minimum standards for
patent protection (e.g., to make offers to sell an act of
infringement), but it does not dictate specific definitions.207
Instead, TRIPS envisions a flexible implementation.208
Further, TRIPS does not require one country to consult
another participant country’s laws relating to a TRIPS
understanding of the on-sale bar. See infra notes 267–69 and accompanying
text.
204. See Rotec Indus., 215 F.3d at 1252 (“Unfortunately, other than stating
that an ‘offer to sell’ includes only those offers ‘in which the sale will occur
before the expiration of the term of the patent,’ Congress offered no other
guidance as to the meaning of the phrase. . . . [T]he legislative history of the
statute offers little additional insight.” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(i) (Supp. 1997))).
205. TRIPS, supra note 132.
206. See, e.g., Rotec Indus., 215 F.3d at 1253 (“[W]e must recognize one of the
agreements’ declared purposes: harmonizing worldwide patent law.”); Hearings,
supra note 161 (“With its signing in Marrakech, we established international
standards for the protection and enforcement of intellectual property that were
unthinkable only a decade ago.”).
207. See CYNTHIA M. HO, ACCESS TO MEDICINE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY:
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON PATENTS AND RELATED RIGHTS 57 (2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1909320 (“There may also be great
diversity in laws because the minimums [required by TRIPS] are often
undefined, leaving room for variation. Thus, TRIPS does not contemplate or
result in uniform laws.”).
208. Whether a country’s implementation fails to meet TRIPS’s minimum
requirements is decided by the Dispute Settlement Understanding, which
provides that all terms are interpreted according to customary rules of
international law. Id. at 60.
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provision, and U.S. laws enacted to comply with TRIPS do not
call for standardization.209
Although consulting other countries’ interpretations of
the term “offer” is not required under TRIPS, such
interpretations provide persuasive authority as to its
meaning.210 As the Federal Circuit has recognized, the fact
that “the United States agreed to [include offers to sell as an
act of infringement], suggest[s] that the amendment to
§ 271(a) reflects the approaches of the other signatory
nations.”211 Thus, consulting foreign nations’ interpretations
of their patent laws relating to infringement for offering to
sell infringing technology is helpful to understanding the
scope of § 271(a). In the next two subsections, this Article
considers United Kingdom and German interpretations of the
offer concept. This Article reviews these two countries for two
primary reasons.212 First, not all countries have judicial
decisions addressing the issue.213 Second, the U.K. and
Germany are similar in many respects to the United States in

209. See Edward Lee, The New Canon: Using or Misusing Foreign Law to
Decide Domestic Intellectual Property Claims, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 19–24
(2005).
210. Id. at 41 n.184.
211. Rotec Indus., 215 F.3d at 1253. Nevertheless, the Rotec court went on to
reject the approach of the U.K., a signatory nation. See infra text accompanying
notes 257–59.
212. Additionally, these countries were considered because their court
decisions were more easily available in English.
213. Research revealed no cases in Canada or Australia directly interpreting
the meaning of the term offer or discussing whether offer includes
advertisements. Interestingly, Canadian patent law does not appear to prohibit
offers to sell infringing products, despite Canada’s obligations under TRIPS
Article 28. Canada’s patent laws give the patentee “the exclusive right,
privilege and liberty of making, constructing and using the invention and
selling it to others to be used,” but does not mention offers to sell. Patent Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, § 42 (1985). The Federal Court of Australia has hinted that
the right to exploit should be construed broadly, since “[t]he definition of
‘exploit’ in the present Act is not exhaustive; it ‘includes’ the matters specified.”
Azuko Pty. Ltd. v Old Digger Pty. Ltd. (2001) 52 IPR 75, ¶ 118 (Austl.). Further,
one decision might imply that a letter soliciting offers to buy would constitute
an offer. In Air-Cell Innovations Pty. Ltd. v Tanwing Int’l Pty. Ltd. (2006) FCA
1117 (Austl.), the court granted an injunction based on evidence that the
defendant sold an infringing product and/or offered the infringing product for
sale. Id. ¶ 23. The evidence of the offer was a “distribution of letters to a
number of potential purchasers” and “a number of entities contacted by the
respondent as potential purchasers of the product.” Id. ¶ 15. Unfortunately,
the court did not detail the letters’ contents, and thus they may have amounted
to a formal contract law offer.
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that they are among the richest and most developed countries
in the world and are net patent exporters.214
i.

The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom’s patent law creates liability for
infringement when a person “makes, disposes of, offers to
dispose of, uses or imports” a patented product without
permission in the U.K.215 The U.K. statute’s “offers to dispose
of” parallels the U.S. statute’s “offers to sell.” While the
U.K.’s term “disposes” arguably connotes a broader category
of transactions than the U.S.’s “sells”216 (e.g., offers of gifts),
both statutes use the identical word offer, and both should
interpret “offer” in the same way.
Since at least 1995, U.K. patent decisions have
interpreted the term “offer” broadly, as evidenced by the
decision in Gerber Garment Technology Inc. v. Lectra Systems
Ltd.217
The defendant in Gerber began advertising an
infringing machine (an expensive apparatus for automatic
cutting of fabrics) about two years before completing any sale
and argued that advertising was not an act of infringement.218
The Gerber court had “no hesitation in rejecting” the
argument that the term “offer” included only contract law
offers.219
The court interpreted “offer” to include
advertisements and individual solicitations, recognizing that

214. Developed countries that create a relatively large number of patentable
inventions will tend to want strong patent rights. Developing countries that
generate less patentable inventions generally prefer weaker patent rights to
give them access to other countries’ technology. See, e.g., Ho, supra note 207, at
59–60; Lee, supra note 209, at 20; J. H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement
Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the Developing Countries?, 32 CASE
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 441 (2000).
215. Patents Act of 1977, 1977 c. 37 § 60(1)(a), (Eng.) (emphasis added).
Others have helpfully discussed the state of the U.K.’s patent laws regarding
offers to dispose. See Holbrook, supra note 149, at 784–86; David Sulkis, Note,
Patent Infringement by Offer To Sell: Rotec Industries, Inc. v. Mitsubishi
Corporation, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1099, 1112–16 (2001).
216. Indeed, other areas of the U.K. Patents Act distinguish between selling
and disposing. See Patents Act of 1977, 1977 c. 37 § 55(1)(a)(ii) (allowing, in
certain circumstances, the government to “sell or offer to sell [another’s
patented product] for foreign defence purposes or for the production or supply of
specified drugs and medicines, or dispose or offer to dispose of it (otherwise than
by selling it) for any purpose whatever” (emphasis added)).
217. [1995] 13 R.P.C. 383 (Eng.).
218. Id. at 411.
219. Id.
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such acts “disturb[] the patentee’s monopoly.”220 Thus, U.K.
patent law recognizes that advertisements and other
promotions harm patentees and should be prevented.
It is worth noting that when interpreting the term “offer,”
the Gerber court relied in part221 on a treaty to which the U.K.
was at the time a signatory, the Convention for the European
Patent for the Common Market (Community Patent
Convention, or simply CPC).222 The CPC was an early
attempt to create a uniform European patent law223 that
never became binding because too few EU member states
ratified it.224 Although not ratified by all EU members,225 the
CPC provides insight into both English226 and EU countries’
views regarding the appropriate interpretation of
infringement for an offer to sell. Specifically, Article 25
provides that a “Community patent shall confer on its
proprietor the right to prevent all third parties not having his
consent . . . from making, offering, putting on the market or
using a product which is the subject-matter of the patent.”227
“Putting on the market” is a broad term that would seem
to include at least formal advertising if not less formal
220. Id. at 411–12 (declining, specifically, to limit offer to a contract law
definition and stating that one “who approaches potential customers
individually or by advertisement saying he is willing to supply a machine, terms
to be agreed, is offering it” (emphasis added)).
221. The court noted that under § 130(7) of the U.K. Patents Act, the
language at issue should be “so framed as to have, as nearly as practicable, the
same effects in the United Kingdom as the corresponding provisions of the . . .
CPC.” Id.
222. Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market
(Community Patent Convention), 1976 O.J. (L 17) 1, available at
http://legis.obi.gr/espacedvd/legal_texts/LAWS_E/eu_cvn01.htm
[hereinafter
CPC]. The CPC, which was signed December 15, 1975, but never became
effective, should not be confused with the European Patent Convention (EPC),
also known as the Munich Convention, which was signed in Munich, Germany,
on October 5, 1973 and became effective on October 7, 1977. European Patent
Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199.
223. Seth Cannon, Note, Achieving the Benefits of a Centralized Community
Patent System at Minimal Cost, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 415, 420–21 (2003).
224. See id. at 421.
225. The failure of the CPC did not have anything to do with the scope of the
offer provisions, but centered on issues such as sovereignty and in what
languages the patents would be published. See Vincenzo Di Cataldo, From the
European Patent to Community Patent, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 19, 28–29 (2002).
226. Though it has since repealed its implementation of the CPC, the U.K.
had at one time adopted the CPC. See Patents Act of 1977 c.37 § 86 (1977)
(Eng.) (repealed 2004).
227. CPC, supra note 222, art. 25(a) (emphasis added).
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promotions. By including the phrase “putting on the market”
in the CPC, the drafters demonstrated that they considered it
necessary to prohibit more than contract law offers in order to
protect patentees. The CPC’s prohibition of advertisements
and other promotions influenced the Gerber court and can
provide persuasive authority to American courts in
interpreting patent law’s offer concept.
ii. Germany
Consistent with U.K. courts, German courts hold that the
term offer “must be understood in the economic sense and
does not coincide with the legal term of a contract offer,”228
but rather includes advertising and related commercial
marketing.229 Thus, German patent law dating back at least
to the 1960’s230 supports an interpretation of an offer that is
broader than a contract law offer.
Because Germany was a party to the TRIPS negotiations,
its pre-TRIPS understanding of an offer to sell in the patent
infringement context suggests a meaning for the term offer to
sell in TRIPS. Congress provided no guidance or legislative
history with its adoption of this TRIPS provision; thus, a
logical assumption is that Congress adopted the meaning
used by the major countries favoring the inclusion of offering
to sell as a mode of infringement. In addition, as with the
U.K.’s interpretation of offer, Germany’s interpretation better
aligns with the policy of preventing an infringer from
generating interest in another’s patented technology to the
harm of the patentee.

228. MARKETA TRIMBLE, GLOBAL PATENTS: LIMITS OF TRANSNATIONAL
ENFORCEMENT § 3.3, at 100 n.106 (2012) (quoting Thermocycler,
Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, 2 U 58/05, Dec. 21, 2006, 2007 GRUR-RR 261).
229. See TRIMBLE, supra note 228, § 3.3 (citing, inter alia,
Kreuzbodenventilsäcke, Bundesgerichtshof, I ZR 109/58, Mar. 29, 1960, 1960
GRUR 423; Kupplung für optische Geräte, Bundesgerichtshof, X ZR 179/02,
Sept. 16, 2003; Reichsgericht, I 137/33, Jan. 13, 1934, RGZ 29, 173;
Zeitlagenmultiplexverfahren, Landgericht Düsseldorf, 4a O 124/05, Feb. 13,
2007; and Schricker, supra note 209, at 787).
230. See Kreuzbodenventilsäcke, supra note 229 (decided in 1960).
Interestingly, German law prohibited infringing offers to sell as far back as
1877. See TRIMBLE, supra note 228, § 3.3.
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3. Construing “Offer” in View of Other Statutes
Debate exists regarding the extent to which a statute’s
words may be interpreted in light of other portions of the
same statute or of related statutes.231 Where one party urges
a specific construction, courts sometimes compare the
language at issue to similar language in the same or related
statutes to demonstrate that Congress knows how to legislate
for a specific result when it wants to.232
For example, in Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford
Junior University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc.,233 the
Supreme Court held that the Bayh-Dole Act, which allows
contractors (e.g., a university) to elect to retain title in
patentable inventions generated during work that the
government funded, did not divest individual inventors of
their rights to inventions234 made during federally-funded
work.235 The Court noted that “Congress has in the past
divested inventors of their rights in inventions by providing
unambiguously” for such divestiture in other statutes, but
“[s]uch language is notably absent from the Bayh-Dole Act.”236
Thus, the Court concluded that Congress knows how to divest
inventors of their rights, but did not do so in the Bayh-Dole
Act.
The concept that Congress knows how to craft precise
legislation may have strong appeal at times, especially when
Congress fails to use a term of art that it consistently uses in
other statutes to capture a desired meaning.237 This logic
231. See YULE KIM, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND
RECENT TRENDS 13–17 (2009).
232. See id.
233. 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011).
234. Under U.S. patent law, the rights to an invention initially vest in the
individual inventor(s), not the inventor’s employer. Id. at 2195. The inventor
may assign in advance her rights to any subsequent invention to her employer,
but the rights nevertheless initially vested with the employee. Id.
235. Id. at 2197–99.
236. Id. at 2195–96.
237. See, e.g., Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 216 (2005) (“Congress
has included an express overt-act requirement in at least 22 other current
conspiracy statutes, clearly demonstrating that it knows how to impose such a
requirement when it wishes to do so.”); Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson 538 U.S.
468, 476 (2003) (construing the word owner to mean direct owner as opposed to
indirect owner, and noting that “[w]here Congress intends to refer to ownership
in other than the formal sense, it knows how to do so.”); Meghrig v. KFC W.,
Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 485 (1996) (“Congress . . . demonstrated in CERCLA that it
knew how to provide for the recovery of cleanup costs, and . . . the language
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could be applied to the offer concept. For example, recall that
§ 32(a) of the Lanham Act mentions both offers to sell and
advertisements.238 Since courts should “construe statutes,
where possible, so as to avoid rendering superfluous any
parts thereof,”239 the Lanham Act appears to treat offers to
sell and advertisements as non-coterminous.
Can one
conclude, therefore, that Congress knows how to distinguish
between advertisements and offers to sell and yet did not do
so in § 271(a)? Since Congress did not do so in § 271(a), the
logic suggests Congress did not intend to include anything
other than contract law offers.
Yet the concept that Congress knows how to legislate for
a specific result has weaknesses in the context of the offer
concept. Specifically, Congress has not used the term offer to
sell in a unified way throughout the law. Although Congress
has at times explicitly mentioned both advertisements and
offers in a statute, in other statutes (e.g., the ESA) it
mentions only offers to sell and yet subsequent
interpretations have defined the phrase to include
advertisements.240 Further, where a term like offer to sell has
evolved in meaning over time, an assumption that Congress
used it in a specific way opposes the canon of statutory
construction (discussed above)241 that Congress uses a term in
light of its meaning at the time of enactment.
As Karl Llewellyn argued years ago,242 the arguments
and counter-arguments can carry on.243 Perhaps the inclusion
used to define the remedies under RCRA does not provide that remedy.”); Cent.
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 176–77
(1994), superseded in part by statute, 15 U.S.C. § 78. (“Congress knew how to
impose aiding and abetting liability when it chose to do so. If, as respondents
seem to say, Congress intended to impose aiding and abetting liability, we
presume it would have used the words ‘aid’ and ‘abet’ in the statutory text. But
it did not.” (citations omitted)).
238. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006); see supra text accompanying note 54.
239. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991); see
also Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 63 (2002) (stating that
interpreting word law broadly could render word regulation superfluous in
preemption clause of the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971); Bailey v. United
States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995) (“We assume that Congress used two terms
because it intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning.”).
240. See supra Part II.C.
241. See supra notes 170–97 and accompanying text.
242. Llewellyn, supra note 173.
243. Further, one can characterize Congress’s failure to discuss advertising
in § 271(a) as evidence that Congress invited courts to decide the contours of the
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of advertising in the Lanham Act may be explained in part on
trademark law’s historic connection to advertising, since
trademarks are used heavily in advertising.244 In addition,
the Lanham Act had the benefit of years of common law
development (both regarding trademarks and unfair
competition) preceding it,245 whereas patent law’s offer to sell
provision was brought about quickly to comply with the
United States’ obligations under the TRIPS agreement.246
In the end, given the diversity of definitions for the offer
concept in the law, the best route would have been for
Congress explicitly to define it. Nevertheless, one can argue
(though how persuasively is open for debate) that Congress
knows how to define the offer concept as something other
than the contract law definition when it wants to, and that its
failure to do so in § 271(a) supports a contract law meaning
for offer to sell therein.
C. Summary
Constructing an optimal definition for the offer concept in
patent law requires a careful policy-based analysis. The
leading policy behind making an offer to sell an act of patent
infringement is to prevent a patent holder from being harmed
by another’s unauthorized commercialization of the patented
technology.247 Because an entity can generate commercial
interest in technology by engaging in advertising and
promotions that harm the patentee via price erosion, patent
law’s offer concept should include not only contract law offers,
but also advertising and promotions.

offer concept or that they had not thought of the issue at all. See YULE KIM,
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL
PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 16 (2008) (“In some cases, Congress intends
silence to rule out a particular statutory application, while in others Congress’
silence signifies merely an expectation that nothing more need be said in order
to effectuate the relevant legislative objective. In still other instances, silence
may reflect the fact that Congress has not considered an issue at all.”).
244. See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal
Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165 (1948).
245. See, e.g., Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of
Trademarks, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 178 (1949); Keith Stolte, How
Early Did Anglo-American Trademark Law Begin? An Answer to Schechter’s
Conundrum, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 505, 506-09 (1998).
246. See TRIPS, supra note 132, and accompanying text.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 140–42.
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In addition to a policy-based analysis of what the offer
concept should encompass, an analysis of the statutory
language and surrounding context provides conflicting
direction regarding the proper construction. Some would
argue that statutory construction is almost always doomed to
such confusion.248 Certainly the preferred result would have
been for Congress to provide a detailed definition in the
statute. That did not happen, however, and thus this Article
turns to consider the best way forward for using the offer
concept in patent law as well as other areas of the law.
IV. CURRENT AND FUTURE USES OF THE OFFER CONCEPT:
THOUGHTS ON A WAY FORWARD
The offer concept began as an eighteenth-century
innovation in the law of contracts and has since infiltrated
areas of the law as diverse as intellectual property and
criminal law. As the offer concept migrated into new areas of
the law, it acquired a diversity of meanings. Sometimes
lawmakers carefully crafted the definition of the offer concept
for its new legal environment, whereas at other times they
inserted the offer concept with no discussion or guidance as to
its meaning. Given the myriad potential definitions for the
offer concept, its meaning is far from clear if it appears in a
statute without definition. In the subsections that follow, this
Article suggests guidelines for how legislatures and courts
should handle the offer concept when it is used in the law.
A. The Offer Concept in Patent Law
This Article first considers a way forward for the offer
concept in patent law. But discussing the way forward
requires an understanding of the current state of the law,
which is provided in the following subsection.

248. See Llewellyn, supra note 173, at 401–03; Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics
and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1179, 1180 (1990)
(“Maxims, after Llewellyn’s work, were considered by most legal academics to be
mere conclusory explanations appended after the fact to justify results reached
on other grounds.”).
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1. The Current Scope of the Offer Concept Under
§ 271(a)
The Federal Circuit has slowly (and somewhat fitfully)
fleshed out what amounts to an offer to sell that infringes
under § 271(a).249 The first clarification came in 3D Systems,
Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc.,250 a case dealing not with a
substantive patent question, but with whether specific
personal jurisdiction251 existed based on an alleged offer to
sell an infringing device.252 Albeit in dicta,253 the court took a
broad view of what constitutes an offer to sell. Applying
federal common law to the question,254 the court indicated

249. Other aspects of the scope of an offer to sell under § 271(a) have been
analyzed and further defined, but these aspects are not directly relevant to this
Article’s focus on the scope of the offer concept. See, e.g., Transocean Offshore
Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1308–
10 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (examining the extraterritorial reach of infringement for an
offer to sell and separately holding that an infringing offer to sell may occur
even if the device offered for sale was not built when the offer was made);
Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding
that “a mere offer to sell a machine [that can perform a patented method]
cannot serve as the sole basis for finding infringement of the claimed method”);
Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2119, 2151 (2008) (examining the extraterritorial reach of infringement for
an offer to sell); Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality and Tangibility After
Transocean, 61 EMORY L.J. 1087, 1094–99 (2012) (same); Rex W. Miller, II,
Note, Construing “Offers to Sell” Patent Infringement: Why Economic Interests
Rather Than Territoriality Should Guide the Construction, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 403
(2009).
250. 160 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
251. Under Federal Circuit law, personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant exists when the relevant state’s long-arm statute permits the
assertion of jurisdiction without violating federal due process. See, e.g., Akro
Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1543–44 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
252. A second personal jurisdiction case, HollyAnne Corp. v. TFT, Inc., 199
F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1999), dealt not with the definition of offer, but rather of
sell under § 271(a). The court held that the offered donation was not an offer to
sell under the statute where the offered donation was small and insignificant,
the donation was never consummated, and the would-be donor appeared not to
be motivated by any current or future commercial gain. Id. at 1309–10. The
HollyAnne court’s focus on sell rather than offer renders it less relevant to this
Article’s analysis.
253. Because 3D Systems concerned personal jurisdiction and not substantive
patent law, its pronouncements about the scope of an infringing offer to sell are
dicta as related to substantive patent law. See Larry S. Zelson, Comment, The
Illusion of “Offer to Sell” Patent Infringement: When an Offer is an Offer But is
Not an Offer, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1283, 1289–99 (2006) (criticizing the Federal
Circuit’s conflation of offer to sell and specific personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence).
254. 3D Sys., at 1379.
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that a price quotation could infringe because “[o]ne of the
purposes of adding ‘offer[] to sell’ to § 271(a) was to prevent
exactly the type of activity [the accused infringer] has
engaged in, i.e., generating interest in a potential infringing
product to the commercial detriment of the rightful
patentee.”255
Thus, in its first exploration of the offer concept, the
Federal Circuit suggested that something less than a formal,
contract law offer (a price quotation) could count as an offer
under § 271(a). This interpretation was short lived. Two
years later the Federal Circuit for the first time squarely
addressed the standard for offer to sell infringement on the
merits in Rotec Industries, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp.256 and
concluded that it should “define § 271(a)’s ‘offer to sell’
liability according to the norms of traditional contractual
analysis.”257
The court refused (without significant
discussion) to adopt the 3D Systems panel’s potentially
broader definition of “offer.”258
While the Rotec court did not explicitly address its
reasons for adopting the contract law standard for an offer,
the court appears to have been heavily influenced by its own
understanding of the Supreme Court’s decision in Pfaff v.
Wells Electronics, Inc.259 The Pfaff Court considered the
meaning of the on-sale bar in § 102(b), discussed above.260
The Pfaff decision devoted the bulk of its attention to how
complete the invention must be before it can be on sale,261 an
255. Id. at 1379. “The price quotation letters . . . state on their face that they
are purportedly not offers, but to treat them as anything other than offers to sell
would be to exalt form over substance. . . . As a matter of federal statutory
construction, the price quotation letters can be regarded as ‘offer[s] to sell’
under § 271 based on the substance conveyed in the letters, i.e., a description of
the allegedly infringing merchandise and the price at which it can be
purchased.” Id.
256. 215 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
257. Id. at 1254–55; see also id. at 1257 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 24 (1979)).
258. See supra notes 253–55 and accompanying text.
259. 525 U.S. 55 (1998).
260. See supra notes 195–203 and accompanying text.
261. See Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 60 (stating that the reason the court granted
certiorari was that “other courts have held or assumed that an invention cannot
be ‘on sale’ within the meaning of § 102(b) unless and until it has been reduced
to practice and because the text of § 102(b) makes no reference to ‘substantial
completion’ of an invention, we granted certiorari” (emphasis added) (citations
omitted)). The court rejected both the reduced to practice test and the
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inquiry not relevant to whether a contract law offer is
required under §102(b). Nevertheless, one paragraph of the
opinion stated that to trigger the on-sale bar, “the product
must be the subject of a commercial offer for sale.”262
The Court did not expound much on what it meant by
“commercial offer for sale,” but the remaining sentences of the
single paragraph discussing the issue provide a strong clue.
The Court stated,
An inventor can both understand and control the timing of
the first commercial marketing of his invention. The
experimental use doctrine, for example, has not generated
concerns about indefiniteness, and we perceive no reason
why unmanageable uncertainty should attend a rule that
measures the application of the on-sale bar of § 102(b)
against the date when an invention that is ready for
patenting is first marketed commercially.263

As the emphasized text highlights, the Court understood
the phrase “commercial offer for sale” to refer to commercial
marketing.264 The term “marketing,” which is defined as “the
act or process of promoting and selling products or
services,”265 is much broader that the contract law “offer to
sell,” and its ordinary meaning at least encompasses
advertising, if not less formal promotions. Thus, one could
read Pfaff to concur with earlier Federal Circuit cases that
understood the term “on sale” to include advertising and
other commercializing activity.266
Despite the Pfaff court’s reference to a broad marketing
standard for the on-sale bar, the Federal Circuit in Group
One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.267 interpreted the language
used in Pfaff to “strongly suggest[] that the offer must meet
the level of an offer for sale in the contract sense, one that
would be understood as such in the commercial

substantial completion test and held that for an invention to be on sale, it must
be “ready for patenting.” Id. at 67.
262. Id. (emphasis added). The Court most likely provided this additional
clarification of the on-sale bar since it was overruling the Federal Circuit’s
totality of the circumstances test, which considered, among other things, the
invention’s completeness and the level of commercialization. See id. at 66 n.11.
263. Id. at 67 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
264. See id.
265. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 984 (7th ed. 1999).
266. See supra notes 201–03 and accompanying text.
267. 254 F.3d 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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community.”268 The Group One court justified this conclusion
with reference to the Pfaff court’s desire for greater
certainty.269 While it is true that Pfaff called for great
certainty in the on-sale bar analysis, determining what
constitutes a contract law offer to sell is arguably no more
certain than determining what constitutes an advertisement,
solicitation, or promotion.270 Further, the Group One court’s
interpretation of Pfaff makes no reference to the Pfaff court’s
use of the term “marketing,” which strongly suggests a
broader meaning for commercial “offer to sell.”
The Federal Circuit’s conclusion to treat the on-sale bar
as requiring a contract law offer was ill-advised and has
invited criticism.271 Aside from its shortcomings in the onsale bar context, the Federal Circuit’s narrow reading of Pfaff
has influenced its decisions under § 271(a). The Federal
Circuit in Rotec stated that “the analysis of an ‘offer to sell’
under § 271(a) is consistent with the [Supreme] Court’s
analysis in Pfaff of § 102(b).”272 Since the Federal Circuit
understood Pfaff as teaching that “the norms of traditional
contract law should be the basis for the on-sale
determinations under § 102(b),” the court allowed its

268. Id. at 1046.
269. Id. at 1047 (“Applying established concepts of contract law, rather than
some more amorphous test, implements the broad goal of Pfaff, which, in
replacing this court's ‘totality of the circumstances’ test with more precise
requirements, was to bring greater certainty to the analysis of the on-sale
bar.”).
270. See Holbrook, supra note 149, at 781–83 (arguing that the contract law
offer to sell standard lacks clarity).
271. See, e.g., Frank Albert, Note, Reformulating the On Sale Bar, 28
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 81, 88 (2005) (noting that the current on-sale bar
test “allows inventors to . . . begin building demand for their invention
. . . [because they] may advertise, give price quotes, [and] send product samples
to potential customers” (footnotes omitted)); Holbrook, supra note 149, at 780–
84, 799 (noting problems with the commercial offer for sale portion of the onsale bar and arguing that “the focus [of the § 102(b) on-sale bar] should be on
what was in the public domain, as opposed to the exact nature of the
transaction”); Mark Levy, An Analysis of the On Sale Bar and Its Impact on the
Structure and Negotiation of Development Agreements, 30 U. DAYTON L. REV.
181, 206 (2004) (outlining strategies for an inventor wishing to commercialize
its invention without triggering the offer prong of the on-sale bar); Stephen
Bruce Lindholm, Comment, Revisiting Pfaff and the On-Sale Bar, 15 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 213, 217 (2004) (noting that “parties are sometimes able to avoid
meeting the [on-sale bar] through careful contracting”).
272. Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1254 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
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understanding to control the meaning of § 271(a).273 The
result is that the offer concept in § 271(a) fails to align
optimally with its policy rationales.274
In cases after Rotec, the Federal Circuit has interpreted
an “offer to sell” under § 271(a) according to the norms of
traditional contract law.275 Interestingly, the same cases
recognize that the primary policy underlying offer to sell
infringement is to prevent a competitor from generating
interest in an infringing product to the commercial detriment
of the patentee.276 Yet the Federal Circuit never discusses the
fact that the policy against allowing competitors to generate
commercial interest (1) suggests patent law’s offer concept
should include advertisements and other promotions, and (2)
differs dramatically from the primary policy undergirding the
contract law offer concept, which is to balance freedom-from
and freedom-to contract.
2. How to Correct the Scope of the Offer Concept Under
§ 271(a)
To correct these shortcomings, the Federal Circuit has at
least two options. First, as an en banc court, it could overrule
its Rotec decision regarding § 271(a) and broaden the offer
concept to include advertisements and other promotional
activities.277 In the alternative, sitting en banc, it could
overrule the Group One panel’s interpretation of the on-sale

273. Id.
“Both sections invoke the traditional contractual analysis.
Therefore, we similarly define § 271(a)’s ‘offer to sell’ liability according to the
norms of traditional contractual analysis.” Id. at 1254–55.
274. See supra Part III.A.
275. See, e.g., Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk
Contrators USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Rotec Indus.,
215 F.3d at 1246); MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon
Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Rotec Indus., 215 F.3d at
1255 and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1979)).
276. Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1309; MEMC, 420 F.3d at 1376 (noting that
“[o]ne of the purposes of adding ‘offer[] to sell’ to section 271(a) was to prevent
. . . generating interest in a potential infringing product to the commercial
detriment of the rightful patentee”).
277. While it can be argued that § 102(b) and § 271(a) should have the same
scope, case law does not require this result. Recall that the 3D Systems panel
“decline[d] to import the authority construing the ‘on sale’ bar of § 102(b) into
the ‘offer to sell’ provision of § 271(a).” 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160
F.3d 1373, 1379 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Although the Rotec court noted that its
interpretation of § 271(a) was consistent with that of § 102(b), it did not require
such consistency. See Rotec Indus., 215 F.3d at 1254.
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bar and instead interpret the Supreme Court’s Pfaff decision
to include advertisements and promotions. Such a decision
would not only better align § 102(b)’s on-sale bar with its
underlying policies, but also would effectively overrule the
Federal Circuit’s Rotec decision under § 271(a), which was
influenced by the Group One court’s interpretation of Pfaff.
Under this scenario, a subsequent Federal Circuit panel
would be free to realign the scope of the offer concept under
§ 271(a).
If the Federal Circuit does not correct the scope of
271(a)’s offer concept, the Supreme Court could do so. The
Court has increasingly taken an interest in patent cases278
and may be willing to take another. As discussed in the
preceding paragraph, a decision altering the scope of either §
102(b)’s on-sale bar or § 271(a)’s offer concept would allow
reform to § 271(a). The Court may be willing to consider an
on-sale bar case if it believes the Federal Circuit’s Group One
decision misinterpreted its Pfaff decision, but this becomes
less likely as more time passes since the Group One decision
in 2001.
Finally, of course, Congress itself could bring clarity to
the offer concept in § 271(a). If Congress chose to act, it
should at a minimum make clear that advertisements should
be included in the definition of an offer. Further, solicitations
and promotional activities that might reasonably affect
market prices should be included. Drawing the precise line
between those promotional activities that might affect market
prices and those that would not might be difficult. To protect
patent holder’s more fully, Congress could err on the side of a
broad definition of promotional activities, knowing that
patent holders will likely not find it cost-effective to bring
suits in cases where proving damages will be difficult.279 It is,
278. See Lucas S. Osborn, Instrumentalism at the Federal Circuit, 56 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 419 (2012).
279. An exception to this might be certain nonpracticing entities (pejoratively
referred to as patent trolls), who might bring suit simply for the opportunity of
settlement money, which defendants may pay even in meritless cases to avoid
expensive discovery and litigation costs. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls,
Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of HighTech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571 (2009); Robin Feldman & Tom Ewing, The
Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2012); John M. Golden, “Patent
Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111 (2007). To the extent that
the defendant has only offered to sell the product but has not sold the product
and does not plan to sell the product, the defendant could try to minimize
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however, unlikely that Congress will be eager to take up
patent legislation in the near future, having passed
multifaceted patent legislation in 2011.280 Therefore, courts
should strive to improve the offer concept in the near term.
B. The Offer Concept in the Law Generally
In some areas of the law, such as the Securities Act of
1933, Congress provided relatively detailed definitions of the
offer concept, which suggests careful thought as to the policy
role that the offer concept would play.281 In other areas of the
law, like patent law and many criminal statutes, the offer
concept is included with little or no discussion of its meaning
in the statute or its history. Because the offer concept has so
many different definitions in the law, a legislature’s failure to
provide a definition or guidance invites confusion. As this
Article has attempted to demonstrate, it is unlikely that the
offer concept’s policy role in contract law will correlate to its
role in another area of law.282 Thus, legislatures should
provide guidance as to the offer concept’s role, none the less
its meaning, within a statute.
The various statutes using the offer concept discussed in
this Article raise many questions. For example, it is unclear
why the Lanham Act prohibits advertisements in § 32, but
prohibits advertisements and promotions in § 43.283 The
Endangered Species Act and its regulations indicate only that
advertisements qualify as offers to sell—do less formal
promotions qualify as well?284 While numerous criminal laws
prohibit certain offers to sell contraband, many do not define
the scope of the offer concept.285 The optimal scope of the offer
concept in each area of the law will depend on many factors.
While a broad definition of offer would perhaps minimize the
undesirable activity (e.g., infringement of trafficking),
litigation costs by asking the court to bifurcate the trial and first determine the
damages. If the plaintiff could not prove damages from price erosion, then the
suit would be relatively inexpensive to defend: the defendant who does not plan
to sell the product could stipulate to infringement and avoid expensive
discovery.
280. Congress passed the America Invents Act in 2011. See supra note 196.
281. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (2006).
282. See supra Part II.
283. See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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broadening the definition too much may have undesired
ancillary consequences. Legislatures are well equipped to
handle these fact and policy-intensive inquiries and should
endeavor to provide as much guidance as possible.
As with any legislation, there is a tension between a
legislature’s desire to provide specific guidance and its
hesitancy to legislate with excessive rigidity. Legislatures
understand their own lack of omniscience and may prefer to
give some flexibility to courts.286 Where legislatures want to
give courts flexibility, they should be relatively clear about
their intent; given the varying meanings of the offer concept
in the law, a court might otherwise unnecessarily fixate on a
specific meaning that the legislature never intended. Where
possible, legislatures should generally strive to explain the
broader contours of the offer concept as used in a particular
statute. For example, making the threshold decision whether
the offer concept will include advertisements would be
particularly helpful. As to whether it should provide more
specific guidance, the legislature must weigh its ability to
craft a detailed rule against the potential need for flexibility
in the law’s development.287 However specific the legislature
decides to be, it should explain the policies behind the offer
concept in the statute to guide courts in future cases.
When courts are faced with interpreting an ill-defined
(and therefore ambiguous) offer concept, they should look to
the policy role of the concept in the statute. Since it is
unlikely that the offer concept’s policy role in a specific legal
area will be similar to its role in contract law,288 courts should
be hesitant to presume that a term like offer to sell should
carry its common law meaning. Courts can rebut the
presumption that offer should carry its contract law meaning
by pointing to the disparate meanings of the offer concept
appearing throughout the law.

286. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 170, at 811–12.
287. The costs and benefits of detailed rules versus flexible standards have
been exhaustively discussed. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:
An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Carol M.
Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988); Cass R.
Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995).
288. See supra Part II.
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CONCLUSION
Contract law’s definition of an offer helps balance
freedom-to and freedom-from contract. Other areas of law
have incorporated the offer concept, but have used it in a very
different way than contract law; namely, to regulate certain
undesirable behaviors. As each area of the law uses the offer
concept in a different policy role, it should adapt the concept’s
definition in a way consonant with its new role. The optimal
definition for an offer concept that regulates undesirable
behaviors will typically be different than the contract law
definition, and thus legislatures should be particularly
careful to provide guidance as to its meaning. Additionally,
courts should hesitate to presume the legislature intended
the contract law definition and should look to the
contemporaneous meanings of the offer concept in analogous
statutes. Courts should also consider the policy role of the
offer concept. Where the concept is a tool to prevent
commercialization of an item, the offer concept should
generally be construed to include not only contract law offers,
but also advertisements and promotional activity.

